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Nexus Redux 
ANJUM GUPTA* 
Pursuant to its obligations under international law, the U.S. government has 
agreed to provide protection to individuals who fear persecution in their home 
countries for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. This protection in the United States takes the form of 
asylum, and the asylum statute states that the United States will protect individuals 
from persecution that occurred or will occur “on account of” one of those grounds. 
The Supreme Court has stated that in order to meet the “on account of” or “nexus” 
requirement, an asylum applicant must provide some evidence, whether direct or 
circumstantial, of persecutor motive. Congress later declared that a protected 
ground must be “one central reason” for the persecution. There is, however, no 
statutory, regulatory, or judicial authority setting forth the proper analytical 
framework for determining nexus in asylum cases. 
In a previous article, I argued that in most cases, the “but-for” causation model 
from tort law would suffice as a method of establishing causation in asylum cases. I 
acknowledged, however, that this model may not provide the proper framework for all 
cases, particularly cases involving mixed or multiple motives for the persecution. 
This Article sets forth a burden-shifting framework for such cases that is inspired 
by the frameworks for assessing causation in U.S. antidiscrimination law and, to a 
lesser extent, tort law. The Article draws from the literature and jurisprudence 
surrounding intent in U.S. asylum law and antidiscrimination law, as well as from 
mixed motives jurisprudence. 
The framework proposed in this Article, used in conjunction with the but-for test 
proposed in the previous article, provides a rule for determining causation in asylum 
cases that would lead to more consistent, fair results and would bring the United 
States more in line with its international obligations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If antidiscrimination law is in its infancy as compared with the law of torts, asylum 
law is embryonic. While the analytical framework for determining causation in torts 
is fairly well established and causation standards in antidiscrimination law have been 
set but continue to evolve, a precise rule for establishing or determining causation in 
asylum law has yet to be announced. This lack of guidance has led to widespread 
confusion and inconsistency in the determination of nexus in asylum cases, 
particularly in cases involving mixed or multiple motives. This Article, in 
conjunction with a prior article entitled The New Nexus,1 proposes a framework for 
assessing causation in all asylum cases. While The New Nexus proposed an analytical 
framework for determining causation in most cases based on the but-for rule in tort 
law, this Article proposes a burden-shifting framework to be used in a subset of cases 
involving mixed or multiple motives. This framework is inspired by causation 
frameworks used in discrimination and tort cases but is tailored to the realities of 
asylum adjudication and the goals of refugee law. The Article considers the critiques 
of the antidiscrimination frameworks in the scholarly literature and jurisprudence 
and sets forth a proposal that can be consistently applied and easily implemented. 
Part I provides the background necessary for a full understanding of the proposal 
set forth in this Article. It begins by discussing the relevant international and 
domestic law related to refugee protection. It then focuses specifically on the nexus 
requirement in international refugee law and U.S. asylum law and makes the 
argument that the lack of a procedural standard for determining nexus has led to 
inconsistent and unfair results in adjudication. This Part also includes a discussion of 
recent developments relating to the determination of nexus in asylum claims based 
on domestic violence. Part II examines the literature and jurisprudence related to the 
difficulties proving motive in asylum law. It then discusses the literature on motive 
in antidiscrimination law, drawing parallels to asylum law and making the case that 
the frameworks employed in discrimination cases may provide some guidance as to 
how to assess nexus in asylum cases. Part III discusses the past and current states of 
the law regarding mixed or multiple motives in asylum cases. It makes the argument 
that prior to enactment of the REAL ID Act,2 the Immigration Agency and courts 
had very little guidance with respect to the proper analysis to be conducted in mixed 
motives cases, and as a result, rulings were inconsistent. After the REAL ID Act’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377 (2014). 
 2.  REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012)). 
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pronouncement that a protected status must be at least “one central reason” for the 
persecution, however, courts struggled with the meaning of the term “central,” and 
still had no guidance as to the proper analytical framework for such claims.3 Part IV 
of the Article sets forth the various frameworks for assessing causation in 
antidiscrimination law and tort law, which are then used as inspiration for the 
proposal set forth in Part V. Part V also anticipates and addresses the possible 
critiques of the proposal. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part begins by setting forth the relevant international and domestic law of 
asylum necessary to understand the nexus framework proposed in this Article. This 
Part also describes the evolution of the nexus requirement in U.S. asylum law. 
Finally, this Part includes a section describing recent developments related to the 
determination of nexus in asylum claims based on domestic violence. 
A. International Refugee Law and U.S. Asylum Law 
On July 28, 1951, the United Nations approved the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the “Convention”), which obligates signatory states to offer 
protection to individuals fleeing their home countries due to a “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”4 Although the United States was not a signatory 
to the Convention, it was a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (the “Protocol”),5 which adopted by reference the provisions of the 
Convention. 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act (the “Act”).6 The Act defines a 
refugee as any person who is unwilling or unable to return to her home country 
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”7 The United States provides two forms of relief for such individuals 
seeking protection in the States: asylum and withholding of removal.8 If an 
individual proves that she is a refugee under the statutory definition and is not 
otherwise statutorily barred from receiving protection, the Attorney General 
(acting through the Immigration Agency)9 may, at his discretion, grant her 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Shaikh v. Holder, 702 F.3d 897, 901–03 (7th Cir. 2012); Ndayshimiye v. 
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2009); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 
734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009); Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009); In re J-B-N-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007).  
 4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 5. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 6. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 7. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2014). 
 8. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West 2014). 
 9. Asylum cases are adjudicated by both the Asylum Office, part of the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), part of the 
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asylum.10 If an individual is granted asylum, she may remain in the United States, 
as well as petition for her spouse and qualifying children to be granted derivative 
asylee status and thereby join her in the United States.11 She will also be able to 
apply for permanent residence and eventually citizenship.12 Withholding of 
removal, on the other hand, is a mandatory (albeit less desirable) form of relief.13 
It does not provide a path to permanent residence or citizenship, and an individual 
granted withholding of removal may not petition for her family members.14 In addition, 
a grant of withholding of removal means only that the U.S. government will not return 
the individual to the country where she fears persecution; the U.S. government can, 
however, send the person to a third country.15 
The burden of proving that an applicant is a refugee pursuant to the Act rests on 
the applicant. To obtain asylum, an individual must show that she suffered past 
persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of one of the 
protected grounds.16 The term “persecution” is not clearly defined in the Act or 
implementing regulations, but courts have interpreted the phrase to require a showing 
of something more than mere discrimination or harassment.17 The persecution must 
occur at the hands of the government or forces the government is unwilling or unable 
to control.18 Furthermore, the applicant must show that she has a status that is 
protected by the Act, and she must show that the persecution occurred or will occur 
“on account of” that status.19 
If an applicant demonstrates past persecution, she is entitled to a presumption that 
she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.20 The Department of Homeland 
                                                                                                                 
 
Department of Justice. The EOIR is composed of immigration judges and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA or “Board”). 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (2014); see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, About the Office, JUSTICE.GOV (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (stating that the EOIR “was created on January 9, 
1983, through an internal Department of Justice (DOJ) reorganization which combined the 
Board of Immigration Appeals . . . with the Immigration Judge function previously performed 
by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now part of the Department of 
Homeland Security)”). Because only the EOIR typically issues published decisions, all 
references to the “Agency” are to the EOIR. 
 10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
 11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). 
 12. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159 (West 2014). 
 13. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2014). 
 14. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (West 2014). 
 15. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b). 
 16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 17. See Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 947–48 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Board 
of Immigration Appeals has not defined persecution and applying its own definition, “the use 
of significant physical force against a person’s body, or the infliction of comparable physical 
harm without direct application of force . . . , or nonphysical harm of equal gravity” (emphasis 
in original)); Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Immigration Act does not, 
however, provide a statutory definition for the term ‘persecution.’”). 
 18. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 231–32 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In 
re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (1987). 
 19. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2014). 
 20. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2014). 
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Security (DHS) can rebut that presumption by showing that there has been a 
fundamental change in circumstances such that she no longer has a well-founded fear 
of future persecution, or that she could avoid persecution by relocating to a different 
part of her home country.21 If the DHS successfully rebuts the presumption of a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, an applicant may still be eligible for asylum 
if she can show “compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return” to her 
home country due to the “severity of the past persecution,” or that she would suffer 
“other serious harm upon removal” to the home country.22 If an applicant cannot 
establish that she experienced persecution in the past, she may still be eligible for 
asylum if she can show an independent well-founded fear of future persecution.23 In 
such cases, it is the applicant’s burden of proving that she could not reasonably 
relocate to another part of her home country to avoid persecution.24 An applicant 
need not show that she would be singled out individually for persecution; instead, 
she may meet her burden by demonstrating that there is a “pattern or practice” of 
persecution against persons similarly situated to the applicant in her home country.25 
The standards for withholding of removal claims are similar to those for asylum 
claims.26 One major difference is that an applicant for withholding of removal must 
show that her life or freedom would be threatened in the future.27 While an applicant 
who shows past persecution is entitled to a presumption that her freedom would be 
threatened in the future, the applicant may not be granted withholding of removal 
based on the severity of the past persecution or the possibility of other serious harm 
if the DHS successfully rebuts that presumption. Another major difference lies in the 
burden of proof. An applicant for withholding of removal must show that it is more 
likely than not that her life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the 
protected grounds.28 While there is no definitive standard for the burden of proof in 
asylum claims set forth in the statute or regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the term “well-founded fear” to require a less stringent burden, hinting 
that even a one in ten chance of persecution might suffice.29 
B. The Nexus Requirement 
In order to make out a claim for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate not only 
that she is a member of a protected group and that she experienced (or fears) harm 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). 
 23. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2). 
 24. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(i). 
 25. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii). 
 26. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2014). 
 27. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). 
 28. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(iii). 
 29. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439–40, 449–50 (1987) (“The High 
Commissioner’s analysis of the United Nations’ standard is consistent with our own 
examination of the origins of the Protocol’s definition . . . . There is simply no room in the 
United Nations’ definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of 
being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no ‘well-founded fear’ of the 
event happening.”). 
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that rises to the level of persecution, but that the persecution occurred (or would 
occur) “on account of” her protected status. This requirement is often referred to as 
the “nexus” requirement. Although the U.S. government changed the Convention 
language from “for reasons of” to “on account of” when drafting the statute, there is 
no evidence suggesting that this change was deliberate or significant at the time it 
was made.30 Thus, there is no insight into the legislature’s reasoning for this decision. 
There is scant international guidance as to the proper standards to be applied when 
determining whether an applicant has established nexus;31 the guidance that does 
exist has evolved largely domestically. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
reasoning that the statute “makes motive critical,” has held that applicants must 
provide some evidence of persecutor motive, whether direct or circumstantial.32 This 
requirement to prove persecutor intent is discussed in greater detail in Part II. 
With respect to cases involving mixed or multiple motives, the vast majority of 
circuit courts to confront the issue before the year 2005 recognized that the 
protected ground need not be the sole reason for the persecution in order for nexus 
to have been established; rather, a protected ground needed to be at least one 
reason, or part of the reason, for the persecution.33 In 2005, however, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19 (1980) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 96-590, at 20 (1980) 
(Conf. Rep.); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1965)); Brigette L. Frantz, Proving Persecution: The 
Burdens of Establishing a Nexus in Religious Asylum Claims and the Dangers of New Reforms, 5 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 499, 526 & nn.175–76 (2007) (explaining the original legislative purpose of 
the asylum system). It appears that the United States suggested the “on account of” language 
during the drafting stages of the Convention, but the “for reasons of” language was adopted 
instead. See U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems, United States of America: Memorandum on the Definition 
Article of the Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless 
Persons) (E/AC.32.2), E/AC.32/L.4 (Jan. 18 1950), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid
/3ae68c164.html; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437 (1987) (describing the Act’s refugee 
definition as “virtually identical” to the Convention definition). 
 31. See, e.g., Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, U.N. GAOR, 22nd mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.22 (July 16, 1951) (speech by 
Mr. Robinson, Israel); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 334 
(2014) (“U.S. law on nexus is in a state of flux . . . .”); Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: 
Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 266 (2002) 
(“[T]here is little consensus as to the appropriate test to be applied in interpreting [the nexus] 
aspect of the definition, and . . . there is pervasive confusion surrounding causation in the 
refugee context.”); Carly Marcs, Spoiling Movi’s River: Towards Recognition of Persecutory 
Environmental Harm Within the Meaning of the Refugee Convention, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
31, 66 (2008) (“The ‘nexus’ requirement is the least understood element of the refugee 
definition. International jurisprudence is either silent on the issue or adopts a particular 
understanding of the requirement with little explanation.”). 
 32. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). 
 33. See, e.g., Mustafa v. Holder, 707 F.3d 743, 751 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Under the 
mixed-motives doctrine applied by this circuit prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, 
which applies in this case, an applicant may qualify for asylum if his persecutors had more 
than one motive for their conduct so long as the applicant demonstrates by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence that his persecutors were ‘motivated, at least in part, by one of the 
enumerated grounds.’” (footnote omitted)); Menghesha v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 142, 148 (4th 
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enacted the REAL ID Act, which required that the protected ground be “at least 
one central reason” for the persecution.34 The Act gave no guidance as to the proper 
interpretation of the word “central,” and circuit courts, the Agency, and scholars 
have struggled with the term ever since.35 
Apart from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that applicants must provide 
evidence of persecutor motive and the REAL ID Act’s requirement that the applicant 
show that a protected ground was at least one “central” reason for the persecution, 
                                                                                                                 
 
Cir. 2006) (“Under the INA’s ‘mixed-motive’ standard, an asylum applicant need only show 
that the alleged persecutor is motivated in part to persecute him on account of a protected trait. 
Recognizing that persecutors often have multiple motives for punishing an asylum applicant, 
the INA requires only that an applicant prove that one of those motives is prohibited under the 
INA.” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)); Mohideen v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567, 570 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“We agree with our sister circuits that the statute’s reference to persecution 
‘on account of’ one of the specified grounds does not mean persecution solely on account of 
one of those grounds.” (emphasis in original)); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“A persecutor may have multiple motivations for his or her conduct, but the 
persecutor must be motivated, at least in part, by one of the enumerated grounds.”); Osario v. 
INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The plain meaning of the phrase ‘persecution on 
account of the victim’s political opinion,’ does not mean persecution solely on account of the 
victim’s political opinion.” (emphasis in original)). 
 34. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 163 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (stating 
that “under this definition it clearly would not be sufficient if the protected characteristic was 
incidental or tangential to the persecutor’s motivation” (quoting Asylum and Withholding 
Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (Dec. 7, 2000))). 
 35. See Shaikh v. Holder, 702 F.3d 897, 901–03 (7th Cir. 2012) (simultaneously 
embracing the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of “one central reason” as well as the Third Circuit’s 
rejection of the term “subordinate”); Ndayshimiye v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 
131 (3d Cir. 2009) (concurring with the BIA’s interpretation but holding that when “the term 
‘subordinate’ is removed, the BIA’s interpretation constitutes a reasonable, valid construction 
of § 208’s ‘one central reason’ standard”); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (analyzing the statutory interpretation to hold that “a motive is a ‘central reason’ if 
the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such motive did not exist”); Shaikh v. 
Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (joining the BIA, Fourth, First, and Ninth Circuits 
in the interpretation of “one central reason”); In re J-B-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 
2007) (holding that, after consulting the dictionary for the suitable meaning of the word 
“central” and applying “common sense” to statutory interpretation, “one central ground” needs 
to be more than “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for 
harm”); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is 
a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 118 (2006) (explaining that “the REAL ID Act 
does not define ‘centrality,’ but it appears to have adopted the term ‘central’ from proposed 
INS regulations issued in December 2000 in which centrality was a major theme. In those 
regulations, the INS proposed that ‘[i]n cases involving a persecutor with mixed motivations, 
the applicant must establish that the applicant’s protected characteristic is central to the 
persecutor’s motivation to act against the applicant’” (alteration in original) (citing Asylum 
and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,598 (Dec. 7, 2000))); James Feroli, 
Credibility, Burden of Proof, and Corroboration Under the REAL Id Act, 09-06 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS 1 (2009) (demonstrating that REAL ID did not drastically alter the previous 
standard and that the Act was implemented to encourage the circuits to apply the same 
standards, particularly relating to mixed motive cases). 
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courts and the Agency have provided no guidance as to procedural standards to apply 
when evaluating whether nexus has been established. In a previous article, I argued that 
this lack of a uniform standard has led to inconsistent application of the rule, largely to 
the detriment of applicants fleeing gender-based persecution or other private harms.36 
I made this argument by examining in depth the treatment of nexus in nine contexts—
forced sterilization, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, trafficking, forced 
marriage, religion, homosexuality, gangs, and membership in a family. 
In the forced sterilization context, for example, the Agency initially held that 
applicants who feared sterilization or forced abortion due to China’s “one-child” 
policy could not establish nexus to a protected ground because the policy was due to 
the government’s desire to control the population and not on account of any 
Convention ground.37 The nexus holding was so problematic that Congress amended 
the refugee definition specifically to resolve this issue in forced sterilization or forced 
abortion cases.38 The Agency has found nexus to a protected ground in female genital 
mutilation cases but, as I argued, its reasoning with respect to nexus appears to be 
out of line with its nexus reasoning in other gender-based cases.39 In cases based on 
fear of domestic violence, trafficking, and forced marriage, the Agency refused to 
find nexus, reasoning that the persecution occurred (or would occur) on account of 
personal or criminal reasons, rather than on a protected ground.40 In the domestic 
violence context, for example, the Agency has held that the abuse occurred or would 
occur because of jealousy, frustration, the “inherent meanness”41 of the abuser’s 
personality, or simply because the abuser was a “despicable person,”42 rather than on 
account of the victim’s gender, political opinion, or social group. But, as I pointed 
out elsewhere, the Agency routinely grants claims alleging fear of persecution from 
a dictator without stopping to ask whether the persecution occurred because the 
dictator was a “despicable person.”43 Similarly, in cases based on fear of trafficking 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 457 (2014). 
 37. See In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 39–40, 45 (B.I.A. 1989) (denying asylum to a 
man fleeing China’s one-child policy and the threat of sterilization because the one-child 
policy “is solely tied to controlling population, rather than . . . a guise for acting against people 
for reasons protected by the Act”); see also Gupta, supra note 36, at 390–92. 
 38. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (West 2014). The statute added the following language 
to the refugee definition: 
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced 
to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been 
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other 
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been 
persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded 
fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to 
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
Id.; see also Gupta, supra note 36, at 392. 
 39. Gupta, supra note 36, at 394. 
 40. See id. at 395. 
 41. Id. at 447 (citation omitted).  
 42. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 926 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 43. See, e.g., Karijomenggolo v. Gonzales, 173 F. App’x 34, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the applicant was persecuted on account of an imputed political opinion by a 
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or forced marriage, the Agency has found that the persecution was actually tied to 
economic enrichment or other criminal or personal aims, rather than to gender or 
social group.44 
In religion cases, the Agency and courts of appeals have found lack of nexus, 
reasoning that there is a distinction between religion (a Convention ground) and 
religious activity (a nonprotected ground).45 Similarly, in some cases based on fear 
of persecution on account of homosexuality, the Agency has denied asylum, finding 
that the persecution occurred because of “personal problems” between the victim and 
the persecutor as opposed to a Convention ground.46 It has done so despite having 
held, decades earlier, that homosexuality constitutes membership in a particular 
social group for asylum purposes.47 With respect to claims based on fear of 
persecution from gangs (typically in retaliation for refusal to join a gang), the Agency 
and courts of appeals have routinely denied asylum, finding that persecution did not 
occur on account of social group membership; rather, it occurred due to the gangs’ 
desire to increase their numbers or to gain more influence and power.48 As I argued, 
                                                                                                                 
 
former military dictator who had close ties to the military); Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1228–
30 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the applicant was eligible for asylum based on his political 
dissidence and being targeted by the government for his political beliefs); see also Gupta, 
supra note 36, at 402. 
 44. See, e.g., Burbiene v. Holder, 568 F.3d 251, 254 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming the 
Agency’s denial of an asylum claim based on fear of trafficking because trafficking is a 
“criminal, not governmental, activity”); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(determining that because the persecution occurred on account of “a dispute between two 
families,” the Immigration Court denied asylum and the Agency affirmed); In re Anon., A# 
redacted (New York, N.Y., Immigration Ct., Feb. 4, 2004), at 19–20 (CGRS Case #1034) 
(referring to her trafficker as a “spurned lover,” the Immigration Court denied asylum); In re 
P-H-, A# redacted (Houston, Tex., Immigration Ct., Mar. 4, 2004) at 2 (CGRS Case #3695) 
(denying applicant’s asylum claim based on fear of trafficking on nexus grounds because her 
fear was based on “the outstanding debt she continues to have stemming from the illegal 
smuggling into United States, and as a result of international criminal conduct”); see also 
Gupta, supra note 36, at 403–07. 
 45. See, e.g., Li v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 500, 510 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming the denial of 
asylum to a man who was persecuted on account of his affiliation with an illegal church, 
reasoning, “it is axiomatic that Li was punished because of religious activities, nonetheless, it 
does not necessarily follow that Li was punished because of his religion”), review dismissed and 
opinion vacated, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Gupta, supra note 36, at 407–08. 
 46. See, e.g., Ayala v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 947 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that because the sexual assault the applicant was a victim of was a “criminal act[ ] perpetrated 
by individuals,” the immigration judge denied asylum (alteration in original)); Boer-Sedano 
v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The IJ concluded that the sex acts that 
Boer-Sedano was forced to perform by the police officer were simply ‘a personal problem’ he 
had with this officer.”); see also Gupta, supra note 36, at 411–14. 
 47. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990); see also Gupta, 
supra note 36, at 411–13. 
 48. See, e.g., Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting the applicant’s asylum claim on the basis that she was attacked by gang members 
not for her political opinion or particular social group, but because she refused to join the 
gang); Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[T]he IJ determined that if Larios 
was indeed targeted by gangs, the motivation would not be on account of his membership in a 
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this holding stands in stark contrast to the grants of asylum in dictatorship cases, 
where the Agency and courts have not stopped to ask whether the dictator was 
motivated for a desire for more influence and power.49 Finally, in claims involving 
fear of persecution on account of membership in a family, the Agency has sometimes 
denied claims, finding that the persecution would occur not because of the 
applicant’s relationship to their family member, but because of the persecutor’s 
desire for revenge or retribution against the family member.50 The Agency has made 
this finding despite the fact that it is well recognized that membership in a family 
constitutes membership in a particular social group for asylum purposes and despite 
the fact that the applicants in those cases had clearly demonstrated that they were 
members of families that were targeted for persecution.51 
Based on these examples, I argued that a new standard for evaluating nexus in 
asylum claims is needed.52 I proposed that the standard that should be used in most 
asylum claims is the but-for standard of causation commonly used in U.S. tort law 
and antidiscrimination law.53 That is, if an applicant can show that but for the 
protected characteristic, it is more likely than not that the persecution would not have 
occurred, nexus is established. I further stated that while meeting the but-for test for 
nexus is a sufficient way of establishing nexus, it may not be the only way.54 I 
acknowledged that a more nuanced approach to evaluating nexus may be necessary 
in some cases where the but-for test fails. Such an approach would be particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 
particular social group but would rather be an attempt to increase the gang’s numbers.”); 
Bartolo-Diego v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming the Agency’s 
finding that “the guerillas did not identify the [petitioner] or seek to recruit him because of any 
political opinion. . . . To the contrary, by [petitioner’s] testimony, it appears to be clear that 
[he] was simply targeted as a young man who might be sympathetic to the guerilla cause.” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re E-A-G-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 596 (B.I.A. 2008) (denying asylum because neither of the applicant’s 
gang-related particular social groups did not meet the social visibility and particularity tests); 
see also Gupta, supra note 36, at 416–19. 
 49. See Gupta, supra note 36, at 418. 
 50. See, e.g., Demiraj v. Holder, 631 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 
08-60991, 09-60585, 2012 WL 2051799 (5th Cir. May 31, 2012) (finding that the applicants 
were harmed as retribution and that “[t]he record here discloses a quintessentially personal 
motivation” despite the acknowledgement that the applicants were harmed because they were 
members of a particular family unit and therefore targeted); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 
982 (9th Cir. 2005) (recalling that the Agency had concluded that the applicant was persecuted 
for retaliation purposes not on account of membership in a particular social group); see also 
Gupta, supra note 36, at 419–22. 
 51. See, e.g., Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 629 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Our prior opinions 
make it clear that we consider family to be a cognizable social group within the meaning of 
the immigration law.”); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(recognizing applicant’s family as a “particular social group”); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (“Social groups based on innate characteristics such as sex or family 
relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social 
groups.”); see also Gupta, supra note 36, at 419–22. But see Demiraj, 631 F.3d at 199. 
 52. See generally Gupta, supra note 36. 
 53. Id. at 428; see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION 
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 985–90 (5th ed. 2009). 
 54. Gupta, supra note 36, at 443. 
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useful in the context of mixed motives cases. This Article sets forth a proposal for 
evaluating nexus in such cases. 
C. Nexus in Domestic Violence Cases, Revisited 
Some important developments in the domestic violence context have taken place 
since the publication of The New Nexus. It is accordingly worth revisiting this area 
of the law. As described in more detail in that article, the Board first addressed 
whether domestic violence could form the basis of an asylum claim in 1999 in In re 
R-A-.55 In that case, Rodi Alvarado, a woman from Guatemala, applied for asylum in 
the United States based on the extreme domestic violence she suffered at the hands 
of her husband.56 She argued that she had been persecuted and feared future 
persecution on account of a political opinion that her husband necessarily imputed to 
her, specifically that “women should not be controlled and dominated by men,”57 and 
on account of her membership in a particular social group, namely “Guatemalan 
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who 
believe that women are to live under male domination.”58 
Though the Board found her husband’s conduct “deplorable,”59 it denied 
Alvarado’s claim, reasoning with respect to the political opinion claim that she had 
not shown a nexus between the abuse and the imputed political opinion.60 It stated, 
“[e]ven accepting the premise that [her husband] might have believed that [Alvarado] 
disagreed with his views of women, it does not necessarily follow that he harmed [her] 
because of those beliefs, rather than because of his own personal or psychological 
makeup coupled with his troubled perception of her actions at times.”61 
With respect to the particular social group claim, the Board first determined that 
the proffered social group was not a cognizable social group for purposes of asylum 
law.62 It reasoned that the social group seemed to have been defined solely for 
purposes of the asylum claim.63 The Board further held that, even assuming Alvarado 
had shown she was a member of a cognizable social group, she had failed to show 
that the abuse occurred on account of her membership in that group.64 The Board 
stated that it understood “the ‘on account of’ test to direct an inquiry into the motives 
of the entity actually inflicting the harm.”65 The Board then concluded that Alvarado 
had failed to show that her husband was motivated to abuse her based on her political 
opinion or social group; instead, the Board found that “[o]ther factors, ranging from 
jealousy to growing frustration with his own life to simple unchecked violence tied 
to the inherent meanness of his personality, are among the explanations or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 56. Id. at 908–10. 
 57. Id. at 916. 
 58. Id. at 917. 
 59. Id. at 910. 
 60. See id. at 917. 
 61. Id. at 916. 
 62. See id. at 917–18.  
 63. Id. at 918. 
 64. Id. at 926. 
 65. Id. at 923. 
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motivations that may reasonably be inferred on this record for the actions of the 
respondent’s husband.”66 The Board also held that it was clear that Alvarado’s 
husband was not targeting her “on account of” her membership in the proffered social 
group because he had not targeted other women in the same social group.67 It 
concluded that he targeted her “because she was his wife, not because she was a 
member of some broader collection of women, however defined, whom he believed 
warranted the infliction of harm.”68  
In January 2001, then Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the decision and 
remanded it back to the Board, instructing the Board to hold the decision pending the 
issuance of proposed regulations on the definitions of nexus, persecution, and 
particular social group and to reissue the decision once the regulations were 
implemented.69 The regulations have yet to be issued,70 and until recently, the Board 
had not revisited in a precedential decision whether domestic violence could be the 
basis of an asylum claim. 
In August 2014, however, the Board issued In re A-R-C-G-.71 In that case, which 
involved another Guatemalan woman who suffered “repugnant” abuse at the hands 
of her husband,72 the immigration judge determined that the applicant had not 
established that her husband had abused her on account of her status as a “married 
woman in Guatemala who was unable to leave the relationship.”73 Instead, he found 
that the abuse was a result of “criminal acts, not persecution.”74 He accordingly 
denied her asylum claim.75 
The Board reversed the immigration judge’s decision, determining that “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constitute a 
cognizable social group.76 It noted, however, that the DHS conceded that “the 
mistreatment was, for at least one central reason, on account of [the applicant’s] 
membership in a cognizable particular social group.”77 Accordingly, and although 
this was the very reason the immigration judge denied asylum, the Board declined to 
address the nexus issue in the decision.78 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Id. at 926. 
 67. See id. at 921 (stating that the immigration judge’s nexus finding was too broad, 
because Alvarado’s husband “did not target all (or indeed any other) Guatemalan women 
intimate with abusive Guatemalan men”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 
Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 114 
(2013). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2012), the Attorney General has the authority 
to certify cases to herself for decision. 
 70. See id.; see also Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 71. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 72. Id. at 389. 
 73. Id. at 389–90. 
 74. Id. at 390. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 392–95. 
 77. Id. at 395. 
 78. Id. 
2015] NEXUS REDUX 477 
 
The Board’s actions in A-R-C-G- highlight the need for a new nexus formulation. 
Although the Board addressed the particular social group issue, an issue that has 
garnered significant scholarly attention,79 the Board did nothing to change the 
landscape of nexus determinations in domestic violence cases. Immigration judges 
are therefore free, even after A-R-C-G-, to determine that the abuse occurred not on 
account of the applicant’s particular social group (cognizable though it may be), but 
on account of the abuser’s “criminal” or “despicable” nature. Indeed, since the 
issuance of A-R-C-G-, the Board has continued to deny domestic violence asylum 
claims on this basis.80 The nexus formulation set forth in this Article, in conjunction 
with the The New Nexus, would fix this problem. 
II. A MATTER OF MOTIVE 
This Article posits a causation analysis for asylum cases inspired by the analyses 
used in U.S. antidiscrimination law. Both asylum cases and discrimination cases 
involve some inquiry into motives (either of the persecutor or the discriminator). This 
Part accordingly begins with an examination of the judicial and scholarly literature 
on motive in both contexts. 
A. Intent in U.S. Asylum Law 
The United States’s focus on persecutor intent in asylum claims arguably traces 
back to its decision to change the Convention language of “for reasons of” to “on 
account of” in its implementing statute.81 While the phrase “for reasons of” implies 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See, e.g., Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s 
Particular Social Group, 49 LOY. L. REV. 287, 298–99 (2003) (arguing that reorienting the 
particular social group definition toward the state’s role in the persecution and defining the 
ground on which these victims are persecuted as their membership in families would bring the 
refugee claims of domestic violence victims within the scope of existing refugee law); 
Deborah Anker, Lauren Gilbert & Nancy Kelly, Women Whose Governments Are Unable or 
Unwilling To Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as 
Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 741–43 (1997) (arguing 
that victims of domestic violence should be able to establish an asylum claim based on 
particular social group or political opinion); Bookey, supra note 69, at 148 (advocating that 
“[t]he United States should adjudicate domestic violence asylum cases consistent with 
international norms, guidance from the United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees, 
and a growing body of jurisprudence in U.S. Federal Courts of Appeals that readily recognize 
gender-defined social groups, and clearly establish that persecution by intimate partners is a 
basis for asylum”); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: 
Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
337, 383 (2010) (arguing that the particular social group of “women who have fled severely 
abusive relationships” should be recognized for asylum eligibility). 
 80. See, e.g., In re D-M-, (B.I.A. Dec. 9, 2014) (unpublished memorandum decision) 
(assuming “the validity of the [applicant’s] proposed particular social group in light of Matter 
of A-R-C-G-,” but denying asylum based in part on the immigration judge’s finding that “the 
actions against taken [sic] the [applicant] were not the result of her proposed social group but 
because her partner was abusive and criminally motivated to harm her”). 
 81. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014). 
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that any reason related to a protected ground, regardless of the persecutor’s motive, 
would be sufficient to establish nexus, “‘[o]n account of’, which is not the language 
of the Convention, implies an element of conscious, individualized direction which 
is often conspicuously absent in the practices of mass persecution.”82 
The language chosen by the drafters of the statute undoubtedly influenced the 
Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.83 In that case, Elias-Zacarias 
applied for asylum because he feared persecution on account of political opinion.84 
Specifically, he stated that guerillas in his home country of Guatemala had tried to 
recruit him and his parents, but he and his parents refused.85 He stated that he did not 
want to join the guerillas for fear of retaliation from the government.86 The Supreme 
Court held that Elias-Zacarias had not established a cognizable political opinion 
under the Act.87 It further held that, for purposes of asylum, it was the applicant’s 
political opinion (and not the persecutor’s) that mattered.88 With regard to nexus, the 
Court stated, “Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to provide direct 
proof of his persecutors’ motives. We do not require that. But since the statute makes 
motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.”89 
Since then, the Agency has required asylum applicants to prove persecutor motive.90 
The Supreme Court’s requirement that asylum applicants prove persecutor intent 
is problematic for several reasons. First, just as the Act’s “on account of” language 
implies a focus on individualized intent absent from the Convention’s “for reasons 
of” language, the Court’s intent requirement seems inconsistent with the language of 
the Convention.91 More importantly, requiring the applicant to prove persecutor 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 
(3d ed. 2007) (emphasis in original); see also Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? 
Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1195 
(1994) (“The 1967 Protocol expresses the causal connection between the feared harm and the 
victim’s status or belief by the phrase ‘for reasons of.’ The phrase ‘for reasons of’ is 
sufficiently broad to permit a finding of causal relationship absent proof of the persecutor’s 
motivation.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
 83. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
 84. See id. at 479. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 480. 
 87. See id. at 483. 
 88. See id.  
 89. Id. (emphasis added and omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223–24 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Whether that 
nexus exists depends on the views and motives of the persecutor.”); In re N-M-, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 526, 532 (B.I.A. 2011) (“A persecutor’s actual motive is a matter of fact to be determined 
by the Immigration Judge and reviewed by us for clear error.”); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
906, 923 (B.I.A. 1999) (examining the evidence of the persecutor’s motives and finding it 
insufficient for a grant of asylum, reasoning, “[w]e understand the ‘on account of’ test to direct 
an inquiry into the motives of the entity actually inflicting the harm”). 
 91. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 82, at 1186–88 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of intent in Elias-Zacarias was inconsistent with the U.N. Handbook and legislative 
history of the adoption of the 1967 Protocol); Bret I. Parker, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v. Elias-Zacarias: A Departure from the Past, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1275, 1304 
(1992) (stating that the requirement that an applicant prove persecutor motive “contradicts the 
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intent is inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention—to provide surrogate 
protection from persecution to individuals whose own countries are unwilling or 
unable to do so.92 Unlike criminal proceedings or even some civil proceedings, the 
outcome of asylum proceedings is not the assignment of blame or punishment.93 
Accordingly, it makes no sense to require proof of the persecutor’s intent. The 
persecutor is not a party to the proceedings; indeed, in most cases, the persecutor will 
not even be aware that the applicant is seeking asylum in the United States.94 The 
aim of asylum law is to provide protection to individuals who fear persecution on 
account of characteristics they cannot change or should not be required to change. 
The proper focus of the nexus analysis, then, should be on the applicant’s 
predicament rather than the persecutor’s state of mind. 
Moreover, as scholars and courts have recognized, intent of another party is 
difficult to prove in any type of case, but it is particularly difficult to prove in asylum 
cases.95 The events leading to a claim for asylum have often taken place thousands 
of miles away and sometimes during periods of extreme social or civil strife.96 
                                                                                                                 
 
statutory language that requires only that the applicant prove a ‘well-founded’ fear”). 
 92. See, e.g., Horvath v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2000] UKHL 37 (H.L.) (“The 
general purpose of the Convention is to enable the person who no longer has the benefit of 
protection against persecution for a Convention reason in his own country to turn for 
protection to the international community.”); Mikhail Izrailev, A New Normative Approach 
for the Grant of Asylum in Cases of Non-State Actor Persecution, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 171, 187 (2011) (“Requiring proof of the persecutor’s motive ignores the 
fundamental quality of non-refoulement and implicitly condemns asylum seekers to be 
returned to places where their lives or the lives of their families may still be at risk.”). 
 93. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for 
Refugees in Support of Respondent at 16, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 
90-1342) (“[R]efugee status examiners are not called upon to decide the criminal guilt or 
liability of the persecutor, and refugee status is not dependent on such proof.”). 
 94. See Ulrike Davy, Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Are They Genuine?, 18 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 53, 107–08 (1995) (“[Persecutors] often try to hide their ‘real’ 
intentions, and even if they do not, they rarely provide their victims with formal statements in 
writing. Under these circumstances, direct evidence of the actual intent is hard to obtain, either 
because it is simply beyond the reach of the victims or because any direct inquiry puts other 
people at risk.”). 
 95. See In Re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489 (B.I.A. 1996) (“Persecutors may have 
differing motives for engaging in acts of persecution, some tied to reasons protected under the 
Act and others not. Proving the actual, exact reason for persecution or feared persecution may 
be impossible in many cases.”); Musalo, supra note 82, at 1186–88, 1193 (“Proof of intent, or 
state of mind, is difficult under any circumstances. In the case of refugees, it is exceedingly 
difficult.”). 
 96. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Implementation of the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees—Some Basic Questions (June 15, 
1992), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cca0.html. (“[UNHRC’s] position on this matter is that 
refugees are refugees when they flee, or remain outside, a country for reasons pertinent to the 
1951 Convention refugee definition, whether these arise in a civil war, in international armed 
conflict, or otherwise. There is nothing in the definition itself which would exclude its 
application to persons caught up in civil war who meet the definition.”); Musalo, supra note 
82, at 1193 (“Generally, the refugee is thousands of miles away from the place where the 
relevant events took place. The refugee does not have subpoena power over his or her 
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Applicants fleeing persecution are unlikely to have the time or state of mind to gather 
evidence of their persecutor’s motives before fleeing their home countries.97 In some 
cases, such as those in which low-level soldiers who are unknown to the applicant 
are carrying out orders, the applicant may not even be able to identify the actual 
persecutor or persecutors.98 The persecutor, to the extent one can be identified, is not 
a party to the asylum claim and is typically not in the country, much less in the 
courtroom.99 The persecutor cannot be called as a witness and is unlikely to supply 
an affidavit in support of the applicant’s case.100 In many cases, there are no witnesses 
to the persecution (other than the applicant), but even if there were witnesses, often 
those individuals are still in the applicant’s home country and unreachable due to 
instability in the country or safety concerns.101 Persecutors do not always inform their 
                                                                                                                 
 
persecutors, nor does the refugee have access to other instrumentalities available in normal 
civil or criminal proceedings in the United States.” (footnote omitted)). 
 97. See Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]ndividuals fleeing 
persecution do not usually have the time or ability to gather evidence of their persecutors’ 
motives.”); In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987) (“In determining whether 
the alien has met his burden of proof, we recognize, as have the courts, the difficulties faced 
by many aliens in obtaining documentary or other corroborative evidence to support their 
claims of persecution.”); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on Burden and Standard of 
Proof in Refugee Claims 3 (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid
/3ae6b3338.pdf (“[I]t should be recognised that, often, asylum-seekers would have fled 
without their personal documents. Failure to produce documentary evidence to substantiate 
oral statements should, therefore, not prevent the claim from being accepted if such statements 
are consistent with known facts and the general credibility of the applicant is good.”). 
 98. See Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that, although the 
applicant did not know his persecutors, there was sufficient evidence to show that Christians 
are persecuted by Muslims in Indonesia); Agbuya v. INS, 241 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing how the applicant was blindfolded throughout the duration of the torture inflicted 
on her by men who identified themselves as members of an armed communist guerilla group). 
 99. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 31, at 288 (2002) (“[T]he Federal Court of Canada has 
warned that adjudicators should not ‘base [their] determination as to whether or not a claimant 
has established a nexus to the Convention on the subjective belief of the alleged persecutors 
themselves, especially since these alleged persecutors are obviously not present at the hearing 
. . . and cannot testify as to their own subjective state of mind . . . .’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Shahiraj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 3 F.C. 453, 
para. 19 (Can. Ont.))). 
 100. See, e.g., Gafoor, 231 F.3d at 654 (noting that persecutors are unlikely “to submit 
declarations explaining exactly what motivated them to act”); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 
F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Persecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with 
affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution.”); Cianciarulo, supra note 35, at 122–23 
(“Obviously, most asylum seekers will not come to court equipped with notarized affidavits 
from their persecutors stating, ‘I, Joe Persecutor, beat and tortured your client on three 
occasions between December 1999 and August 2003 on account of her political opinion 
against our oppressive but beloved dictator. Her political opinion was foremost in my mind 
when this occurred.’”). 
 101. See, e.g., Omondi v. Holder, 674 F.3d 793, 799–800 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming the 
lower courts determination that despite the applicant’s credible testimony, his application 
lacked a credible witness since the affidavit sent by the sole witness, aside from the 
persecutors, was insufficiently detailed to support the applicant’s assertion that police officers 
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victims of the reasons for the persecution and, in some cases, may try to hide their 
reasons, making proving them even more difficult.102 
Finally, focus on the actual or “real” intent of the persecutor will sometimes lead to 
absurd results. In the domestic violence context, for example, adjudicators have often 
found that the “real” motivation of the abuser was to establish power and control over 
the victim103 or that the abuser was actually motivated by jealousy or anger rather than 
gender.104 But it is no coincidence that the vast majority of domestic violence victims 
are women,105 and focus on the abuser’s “real” intentions ignores the important role 
that gender plays in domestic violence cases. Or, as one scholar noted: 
[T]he cruel experiments people had to suffer in Nazi concentration 
camps . . . might be described as harm inflicted in order to promote 
medical science. . . . Yet, these purposes do not reflect the whole picture 
of history. It was not by coincidence that Jews, Gypsies or homosexuals 
had to suffer for the “progress” of medical science. They had to suffer 
because, according to certain racial or social “theories”, they were 
deemed inferior and unworthy.106 
                                                                                                                 
 
starved, abused, and raped him); Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that 
the applicant failed to obtain affidavits that substantiated that he practiced Fulan Gong in China 
and that he failed to prove that these affidavits were unavailable.); Izrailev, supra note 92. 
 102. See, e.g., Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The fact that a 
persecutor believes the harm he is inflicting is ‘good for’ his victim does not make it any less 
painful to the victim, or, indeed, remove the conduct from the statutory definition of 
persecution. The BIA majority’s requirement that an alien prove that her persecutor’s 
subjective intent was punitive is unwarranted.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 
206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 
141 (2013) (quoting an unpublished decision by an immigration judge stating, “[i]t appears 
that the abuse suffered by Respondent, although tragic, was the result of [her abuser’s] efforts 
to exert power and control over her, not her membership in any particular social group” 
(alteration in original)). 
 104. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 926 (B.I.A. 1999) (“Other factors, ranging from 
jealousy to growing frustration with his own life to simple unchecked violence tied to the 
inherent meanness of his personality, are among the explanations or motivations that may 
reasonably be inferred on this record for the actions of the respondent’s husband.”). 
 105. See SHANNON CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
NCJ 239203, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2010, at 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf (finding that about 4 in 5 victims of domestic 
violence were women from 1994 to 2010); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 79, 343 
(explaining that domestic violence is not random but a calculated pattern for an intimate 
partner to exert power and control); Gupta, supra note 36, at 445–47 (advocating for a 
reframing of the nexus requirement to a but-for standard, which would allow for a broader 
analysis of gender-based claims). See generally Bethany Lobo, Women as a Particular Social 
Group: A Comparative Assessment of Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United 
Kingdom, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 361 (2012) (arguing that gender persecution should be a basis 
for asylum under the particular social group category). 
 106. Davy, supra note 94, at 108–09. 
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Overreliance on evidence of the persecutor’s “real” motives can thus distract from the 
victim’s status as a reason for the persecution in favor of reasons unrelated to protected 
grounds, even when the protected status was an actual cause of the persecution. 
For these reasons, emphasis on the motivations of persecutors is misplaced; the 
real focus should be on the status of the victim. The but-for test set forth in The New 
Nexus and the approach proposed in this Article would ease the applicant’s burden 
to prove the persecutor’s precise motivations and would refocus the nexus 
determination on the status of the applicant. 
B. Intent in U.S. Antidiscrimination Law 
There are obvious similarities between asylum law and antidiscrimination law. 
Both involve protected statuses or characteristics defined by law, both involve harms 
to the applicant or plaintiff, and both involve an assessment of whether the protected 
characteristic or status gave rise to the harm. It is useful, then, to look to the relevant 
U.S. antidiscrimination law for guidance as to how the nexus requirement in U.S. 
asylum law might be formulated. 
As in asylum law, scholars and courts have criticized attempts to require evidence 
of actual intent107 in antidiscrimination cases. They have noted, for example, that it 
is difficult to prove motive in discrimination cases. Although defendants, unlike 
persecutors, are party to the litigation, their motives are similarly difficult to prove 
because they are unlikely to admit to discriminatory motive or to leave a trail of 
evidence pointing to motive.108 Moreover, plaintiffs in discrimination actions may 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Scholars have noted the difference between “intent” and “motive,” and contend that the 
word “motive” is more appropriate in this context. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision 
Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 500 (2001) (“In describing disparate treatment claims, the Court uses 
the terms discriminatory intent and discriminatory motive interchangeably, as will we. In fact, 
however, motive is the more accurate term, as it focuses on the reason for an act or why an act is 
occurring, not on whether the employer intends to perform the act.” (footnote omitted)). But the 
courts and much of the literature use the terms interchangeably, and I have done so as well. 
 108. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Proof of [intentional 
discrimination in employment] is always difficult. Defendants of even minimal sophistication 
will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it; and because 
most employment decisions involve an element of discretion, alternative hypotheses (including 
that of simple mistake) will always be possible and often plausible.”); see also Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of 
Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1982) (“Evidence of illicit intent may be 
extremely difficult to obtain . . . . Plaintiffs’ chances of proving illicit intent will, therefore, turn 
to a great degree on judicial rulings as to what kind of evidence of such intent plaintiffs are 
required to produce at various stages of the trial process, and with what kind of assistance from 
the employer.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1177 
(1995) (“Disparate treatment plaintiffs face a thorny problem. In short, courts have construed 
section 703 of Title VII, like 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983, to require proof of intent to 
discriminate in disparate treatment cases. But, as numerous courts have acknowledged, proving 
such intent is particularly difficult in employment-related disputes.”). 
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face obstacles due to evidentiary exclusions.109 
Antidiscrimination law scholars have made additional arguments that are also 
applicable to the asylum law context. Scholars have argued, for example, that while 
some Supreme Court discrimination decisions might be read to require a conscious 
decision to act on the basis of “inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes,”110 decisions 
on the whole should not be read to require any hostile animus, or intent to punish, on 
the part of the defendant.111 In other words, it should not matter that an adverse 
employment decision was driven by an unprotected reason, such as a “benign 
business objective[],”112 as long as the protected characteristic played a role in the 
decision.113 Scholars suggest that discriminatory motive should not be measured by 
animus, but instead should be understood “as a causation concept, one that asks 
whether the plaintiff’s race, sex, etc. caused the decision to occur.”114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. See Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The 
Eighth Circuit found that aspect noteworthy in both cases and expressed the opinion that 
‘blanket evidentiary exclusions can be especially damaging in employment discrimination 
cases, in which plaintiffs must face the difficult task of persuading the fact-finder to disbelieve 
an employer’s account of its own motives.’” (quoting Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr., 
900 F.2d 153, 155 (8th Cir. 1990))); Riordan, 831 F.2d at 698 (“A plaintiff’s ability to prove 
discrimination indirectly, circumstantially, must not be crippled by evidentiary rulings that 
keep out probative evidence because of crabbed notions of relevance or excessive mistrust of 
juries.”); Susan K. Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional Employment 
Discrimination If She Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances: The Need for Broad 
Workforce and Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 159, 204–05 (1996) 
(arguing for the ability to access nationwide discovery in disparate treatment cases because of 
the difficulty of obtaining evidence of discrimination). 
 110. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). 
 111. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To 
prove the discriminatory intent necessary for a disparate treatment or pattern or practice claim, 
a plaintiff need not prove that a defendant harbored some special ‘animus’ or ‘malice’ towards 
the protected group to which she belongs.”); White & Krieger, supra note 107, at 497–98; see 
also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court 
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 288 (1997) (“Proving that a defendant acted with animus or an 
illicit motive will generally suffice to establish intent to discriminate, however, neither animus 
nor motive is required to prove intent.” (emphasis in original)). 
 112. White & Krieger, supra note 107, at 498; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If 
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to 
job performance, the practice is prohibited.”). 
 113. See Lewis v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010) (“Unless and until the 
defendant pleads and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by 
showing the stated elements” of a Title VII disparate impact claim.); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 
S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (finding that the City’s promotion tactics were race based and did 
not meet the business necessity standard); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 
(1991) (rejecting the argument of a battery manufacturer that uses lead that discriminating 
against women because of their reproductive capacity was a business necessity); White & 
Krieger, supra note 107, at 498. 
 114. White & Krieger, supra note 107, at 498; see also Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing 
Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court’s Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on 
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This argument has a parallel in asylum law. In one context, the Agency appeared 
to recognize that applicants need not prove animus on the part of the persecutor. In 
In re Kasinga, the Agency considered the case of a young woman who feared that 
she would be subjected to female genital mutilation if returned to her home country, 
Togo.115 The Board of Immigration Appeals granted asylum, reasoning, “[T]here is 
no legitimate reason for [female genital mutilation].”116 It “agree[d] with the parties 
that, [female genital mutilation] is practiced, at least in some significant part, to 
overcome sexual characteristics of young women of the tribe who have not been, and 
do not wish to be, subjected to [female genital mutilation].”117 It accordingly found 
that the applicant had established a nexus between the feared persecution and a 
particular social group.118 
Interestingly, in finding that nexus had been established, the Board seemed 
relatively unconcerned with finding a direct link between the persecutor’s motives and 
the Convention ground. Indeed, according to the attorney who litigated Kasinga’s case, 
documentary evidence demonstrated that “[i]t was often midwives or elders who 
carried out the [female genital mutilation] itself, which they believed was a positive act 
for the young woman and larger community.”119 The government’s reply brief stated 
that the elders or midwives “did not have an intent to punish for a Convention reason; 
to the contrary, ‘presumably most of . . . [them] believe that they are simply performing 
an important cultural rite that bonds the individual to society.’”120 Nevertheless, the 
Board’s decision came close to saying that the intent of the individual persecutor is not 
determinative121 as long as the practice of female genital mutilation is generally 
conducted for reasons related to a Convention ground. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998) (“The undeniable presence 
of discriminatory motives made this question one of pure causation: to resolve the case, the 
courts had to decide what it means to say that an employment decision is made ‘because of’ 
the employee’s status.”); Selmi, supra note 111, at 289 (“What the Court means by intent is 
that an individual or group was treated differently because of race. Accordingly, a better 
approach is to concentrate on the factual question of differential treatment. In this way, the 
key question is whether race made a difference in the decision-making process, a question that 
targets causation, rather than subjective mental states.”); D. Don Welch, Removing 
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 739 (1987) (“Motive is a causal concept. It comes into play when a 
concern exists that decisions were made ‘because of’ or ‘on the grounds of’ certain factors.”). 
 115. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 116. Id. at 366. 
 117. Id. at 367. 
 118. Id. at 368 (“The applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in the form of 
[female genital mutilation] if returned to Togo. The persecution she fears is on account of her 
membership in a particular social group consisting of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
Tribe who have not had [female genital mutilation] . . . and who oppose the practice.”). 
 119. Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A 
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 799 (2003). 
 120. Id. at 800 (alteration in original) (quoting Gov’t’s Brief in Response to Applicant’s 
Appeal from Decision of Immigration Judge at 16, In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 
1996) (No. A73-476-695)). 
 121. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365 (“[M]any of our past cases involved actors who 
had a subjective intent to punish their victims. However, this subjective ‘punitive’ or 
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However, the Board’s reasoning with respect to nexus in Kasinga appears out of 
sync with its nexus holdings in other contexts.122 In most cases, relying on the 
Elias-Zacarias decision, the Board has required a showing of persecutor motive.123 
Consistent with its reasoning in Kasinga and with arguments made by 
antidiscrimination law scholars, the Agency should not require applicants to 
demonstrate animus on the part of the persecutors. Instead, as long as the Convention 
ground played a role in leading to the persecution, the nexus requirement should be 
found to have been met. The analysis proposed in this Article would bring nexus 
analysis in line with this principle. 
Antidiscrimination law scholars also criticize the motive requirement for ignoring 
the important concept of unconscious discrimination. In describing its motivation 
analysis in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court stated: 
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one 
of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a 
woman.124 
But, as scholars have noted, “This statement reflects an assumption that, when 
disparate treatment discrimination occurs, the discriminator is, at the moment a 
decision is made, consciously aware that he or she is discriminating.”125 The 
argument is that when a protected status causes the adverse employment action to 
occur, in whole or in part, the defendant should be held liable even if the defendant 
had no awareness that he was taking the action based on the protected status.126 
Studies in social cognition have shown that individuals can, and often do, 
                                                                                                                 
 
‘malignant’ intent is not required for harm to constitute persecution.”). 
 122. See Gupta, supra note 36, at 394–96. 
 123. See, e.g., In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223–24 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Whether that 
nexus exists depends on the views and motives of the persecutor.”); In re N-M-, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 526, 532 (B.I.A. 2011) (“A persecutor’s actual motive is a matter of fact to be determined 
by the Immigration Judge and reviewed by us for clear error.”); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
906, 923 (B.I.A. 1999) (examining the persecutor’s motives and finding them insufficient for 
a grant of asylum, reasoning, “[w]e understand the ‘on account of’ test to direct an inquiry into 
the motives of the entity actually inflicting the harm”). 
 124. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
 125. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1030 (2006). 
 126. See Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts’ 
Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 271 (1994) 
(noting that “discrimination that affects upper-level women is often unintentional and 
unconscious”); Krieger, supra note 108, at 1164 (arguing that the Courts should adopt doctrine 
that consider subtle or unconscious discrimination); White & Krieger, supra note 107, at 509 
(arguing that “[i]f a plaintiff's race or sex caused an employment action to occur, then liability 
should be present, even if the decision maker was unaware that he was taking the prohibited 
factor into account”). 
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discriminate on the basis of gender or some other protected characteristic without the 
awareness that they are doing so.127 
This criticism of the motive requirement applies with equal force in the asylum 
law context. Cases involving women fleeing domestic violence provide a good 
example. Abusers asked for their reasons for the abuse, even if answering honestly, 
likely would not list gender among them. In fact, in its decisions refusing to find that 
abuse occurred on account of a protected ground, the Agency has listed reasons for 
domestic violence, including “jealousy,” “growing frustration with his own life,” and 
“simple unchecked violence tied to the inherent meanness of his personality.”128 But 
this reasoning ignores the clear role that gender plays in domestic violence.129 
Despite their criticisms, these same scholars have not advocated for overruling 
Supreme Court precedent or for the adoption of a new regime for proving causation 
in discrimination cases. Nor have they argued for the admission of different types of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 125, at 1031–34; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses 
of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2005) (demonstrating “that most of us have implicit 
biases in the form of negative beliefs (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) against racial 
minorities”). 
 128. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 926; see, e.g., Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, 
Gender-Based Asylum: An Analysis of Recent Trends, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1535 
(2000) (stating that in Matter of D-K-, the immigration judge “denied asylum, ruling that Ms. 
Kuna had not been persecuted on account of her membership in either group, or for any political 
reason, but solely because her husband was ‘a despicable person’” (citation omitted)). 
 129. See, e.g., CLAUDIA GARCÍA-MORENO, HENRICA A.F.M. JANSEN, MARY ELLSBERG, 
LORI HEISE & CHARLOTTE WATTS, WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON 
WOMEN’S HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: INITIAL RESULTS ON 
PREVALENCE, HEALTH OUTCOMES AND WOMEN’S RESPONSES viii (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (surveying and analyzing 
data collected from ten countries and finding that “[v]iolence against women is both a 
consequence and a cause of gender inequality”); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 26 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij
/183781.pdf (finding that one out of five women in the United States experience domestic 
violence); U.N. Dev. Fund for Women, Not a Minute More: Ending Violence Against Women 
6 (Gloria Jacobs ed., 2003), http://www.unrol.org/files/312_book_complete_eng.pdf 
(“Throughout the world, . . . one in three women will be raped, beaten, coerced into sex or 
otherwise abused in her lifetime.”); Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the 
Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 303, 305 (1994) 
(arguing that “[d]omestic violence is not gender-neutral” and that “domestic violence against 
women is systemic and structural, a mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is built 
upon male superiority and female inferiority, sex-stereotyped roles and expectations, and the 
economic, social and political predominance of men and dependency of women”); Molly 
Dragiewicz & Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical Data 
for Lawyers Considering Equal Protection Analysis, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
229, 231 (2009) (highlighting that gender plays an important role in domestic violence); 
Valorie K. Vojdik, Conceptualizing Intimate Violence and Gender Equality: A Comparative 
Approach, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 527 (2008) (advocating for a human rights approach 
which “offers a contextualized understanding of the relationship between intimate violence 
and gender subordination”). 
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evidence to prove causation. Instead, some have argued that “inferences reasonably 
drawn from that evidence, and the nature of the ultimate fact the evidence would be 
offered to prove, would expand to accommodate the insight that disparate treatment 
can result from the uncorrected influence of implicit stereotypes as well as from their 
deliberate, fully conscious use.”130 Similarly, as shown below, asylum applicants 
should be able to use the types of evidence they have always used to prove their cases, 
but under the proposed framework, the inferences drawn from those pieces of evidence 
will accommodate the notion of implicit or unspoken bias. 
This Article proposes a framework for assessing nexus in asylum cases that is 
inspired by the current framework for demonstrating causation in antidiscrimination 
cases but that also accounts for the criticisms of the motive requirement in the 
antidiscrimination law scholarly literature. Although The New Nexus provided a 
framework for assessing causation in asylum cases generally, the framework proposed 
in this Article is aimed at determining nexus in mixed or multiple motives cases. What 
follows is a discussion of mixed motives in U.S. asylum law. 
III. MIXED MOTIVES IN ASYLUM CASES 
Before passage of the REAL ID Act, the Agency and courts evaluating the nexus 
requirement in asylum claims had only Elias-Zacarias to look to for guidance. That 
decision’s requirement that an applicant prove persecutor motive offered little by 
way of guidance with respect to claims involving mixed or multiple motives. 
Consequently, the courts and Agency struggled to assess such claims. Unfortunately, 
the guidance provided by REAL ID’s “one central reason” amendment proved 
inadequate. Courts continue to face difficulties assessing claims involving mixed or 
multiple motives, resulting in inconsistent rulings. This Article sets forth a proposal for 
determining nexus in these claims that will lead to more consistent and fair results. 
What follows is an examination of the asylum case law on mixed motives or multiple 
motives before and after enactment of the REAL ID Act. 
In 1996, the Board carried out an exhaustive analysis of mixed motives claims in 
In re S-P-.131 In that case, the applicant was a native of Sri Lanka and ethnically 
Tamil.132 In 1993, the applicant was taken by members of the militant separatist 
organization the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the “Tigers”)133 and forced to 
work as a welder and live in their camp.134 Although the Tigers did not harm him, 
the applicant believed that they were watching him and would severely punish him 
if he attempted to escape.135 
Several months later, Sri Lankan Army soldiers raided the Tigers’ camp.136 They 
accused the applicant of being a Tiger, and they took him and twelve other workers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 125, at 1059. 
 131. 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 132. Id. at 487. 
 133. Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing the Tigers as 
“a terrorist organization based in northern Sri Lanka that for more than thirty years has been 
waging a violent campaign to create an independent state for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority”). 
 134. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 487. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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to an army camp.137 They later transferred the applicant to an army prison in Colombo, 
where he was imprisoned for approximately six months.138 During this time, the 
applicant was interrogated, threatened, tied up, beaten, and “placed in a room with 
burning chilies which caused choking and smoke inhalation.”139 The soldiers also put 
a gun to his head, told him they would kill him if he did not “tell the truth,” and dunked 
his head in a bucket of water.140 The beatings and torture sometimes took place during 
the interrogations, but otherwise took place merely because the soldiers were drunk.141 
The applicant was released from prison when his uncle bribed a prison official.142 He 
escaped from Sri Lanka to the United States a few months later, but before he left the 
country, policemen looked for him at his uncle’s home.143 
The immigration judge denied asylum, finding that the abuse was inflicted due to 
“ongoing civil strife in Sri Lanka,” as opposed to on account of any of the protected 
grounds.144 On appeal, the Board stated that it was required to consider whether the 
harm inflicted upon the applicant occurred “for reasons related to government 
intelligence gathering,”145 which does not constitute a Convention ground; on account 
of “political views imputed to the applicant,”146 which is a Convention ground;147 “or 
for some combination of these reasons.”148 The Board characterized this case as one 
involving multiple or mixed motives.149 
The Board sustained the applicant’s appeal, finding that he had met his burden of 
proving that he had been persecuted at least in part on account of his imputed political 
opinion.150 The Board reasoned that because the applicant was not charged with any 
crime by the Sri Lankan Army, the abuse continued long after the conflict ended, and 
the abuse occurred in situations unrelated to intelligence gathering, it was 
“reasonable to believe that those who harmed him were in part motivated by an 
assumption that his political views were antithetical to those of the Government.”151 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 487–88. 
 141. Id. at 488. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 492. 
 146. Id. 
 147. It is well settled that persecution on account of imputed political opinion constitutes 
persecution on account of political opinion under the Act. See, e.g., Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 
F.3d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is wide endorsement of the concept of persecution on 
account of imputed political opinion . . . .”); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 
1997) (“[The court] consider[s] . . . the political views the persecutor rightly or in error 
attributes to his victims. If the persecutor attributed a political opinion to the victim, and acted 
upon the attribution, this imputed view becomes the applicant’s political opinion as required 
under the Act.”); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601–02 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
imputed political opinion is still a valid basis for asylum under Elias-Zacarias). 
 148. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 492. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 495–96. 
 151. Id. at 496. 
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The Board also made some important, broad observations about mixed motives 
claims. First, the Board noted the difficulty in proving the exact motives of the 
persecutor.152 It stated that persecutors often act for more than one reason, that an 
applicant is not required to prove “conclusively” why the persecution occurred or 
would occur in the future, and that such a requirement would run contrary to the 
“well-founded fear” standard set forth in the Act’s definition of a refugee because 
those words indicated that the harm should be viewed from the perspective of the 
victim rather than the persecutor.153 Second, the Board noted the importance of 
keeping in mind the “fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.”154 
Specifically, the Board noted that Congress’s goal in enacting the Refugee Act was 
to bring the United States into conformity with the Refugee Convention and to evince 
a national commitment to addressing humanitarian concerns.155 
The Board cited the U.N. General Assembly’s declaration that the grant of asylum 
be considered a “peaceful and humanitarian act,” not to be regarded as “unfriendly 
by any other state.”156 It reasoned that the goal of asylum law was to provide 
protection to applicants who met the definition of a refugee, not to pass judgment 
against the applicant’s home country.157 Instead, the judgment is “about the 
reasonableness of the applicant’s belief that persecution was based on a protected 
ground.”158 The Board concluded, “Such an approach is designed to afford a 
generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.”159 
Despite the “generous standard” that the Board appeared to endorse in In re S-P-, 
just two years later and in the same jurisdiction, the Board denied the mixed motives 
claim at issue in Gafoor v. INS.160 Gafoor, a Fijian of Indian descent, was a police 
officer in Fiji at a time when severe mistreatment of Indo-Fijians by native Fijians 
was rampant.161 One day when Gafoor was on patrol, he heard screams coming from 
a nearby street.162 When he investigated, he found a man dressed in civilian clothing 
raping a thirteen-year-old girl.163 He arrested the man, but when he took him to the 
police station, he learned from his superior that the man was a high-ranking army 
officer.164 He was ordered to release the man without charging him.165 Immediately 
thereafter, Gafoor was targeted by the army officer and other army officials.166 He 
was beaten, imprisoned in an army camp for one week, and threatened with death.167 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See id. at 492. 
 153. See id. at 489. 
 154. Id. at 492. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. (quoting Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. res. 2312 (XXII), 22 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967)). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. 231 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 161. See id. at 648–49. 
 162. Id. at 649. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
490 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:465 
 
At one point, the soldiers beat him to the point of unconsciousness and left him in a 
ditch.168 During some of the abuse, the soldiers asked Gafoor why he had arrested 
the high-ranking officer.169 They also accused him of opposing the army. During the 
last beating, they told him he “should go back to India.”170 
The immigration judge denied Gafoor’s application for asylum, finding that the 
persecution was motivated by revenge, not by Gafoor’s ethnicity or political opinion.171 
In September 1998, the Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision; while it did 
not dispute that the treatment Gafoor endured rose to the level of persecution, it found 
that there was no nexus between the persecution and a protected ground.172 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded, reasoning that the record 
evidence “compels a conclusion that [Gafoor] was persecuted not solely because he 
arrested a high-ranking army officer, but also because of his race and the political 
opinion imputed to him by the soldiers.”173 The court reasoned that the statements 
the officers made to Gafoor evidenced their belief that Gafoor had “challenged the 
notion that ethnic Fijians were above the law.”174 The court cited principles of 
antidiscrimination law in concluding that applicants for asylum are not required to 
show that the persecution occurred solely on account of a protected ground; rather, a 
showing that the persecution occurred “at least in part” on account of a protected 
ground was sufficient.175 
Gafoor was not an isolated case. In other mixed motives cases after In re S-P-, 
the Board improperly applied mixed motives analysis and declined to find that the 
applicant had demonstrated nexus to a protected ground.176 
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v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 629, 637 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Given the overwhelming evidence of an 
imputed political opinion in this case, and given the BIA’s apparent imposition of a single 
motive requirement, we do not find substantial evidence to support the BIA’s conclusion.”). 
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A review of the remainder of the pre-REAL ID case law reveals that the Agency 
and courts struggled with mixed motives cases in the absence of congressional or 
Supreme Court guidance; nevertheless, the consensus appeared to be that an 
applicant in a mixed motives case was required to prove that the persecution took 
place “at least in part” on account of a protected ground.177 
Then in 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which required the Convention 
ground to be “at least one central reason” for the persecution.178 The Act gave no 
guidance as to the proper interpretation of the word “central,” and the Agency and 
courts have struggled to define the term ever since. 
Shortly after passage of the REAL ID Act, the Board pointed to the language of 
the Act and its legislative history along with the plain meaning of the word “central” 
and concluded that the standard set forth in the statute did not “radically alter[]” its 
existing standard for adjudicating mixed motives cases.179 The Board clarified that 
an applicant must show that the protected ground played more than a minor role in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. See, e.g., Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 
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grounds.”); Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Although an applicant is not 
required to present evidence showing, to the exclusion of all other factors, that the persecutor 
was motivated by a protected ground, the evidence must still be of such weight that it compels 
the factfinder to conclude that the applicant suffered past persecution or has a well-founded 
fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground.”); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 
1028 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The plain meaning of the phrase ‘persecution on account of the victim’s 
political opinion,’ does not mean persecution solely on account of the victim’s political 
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 178. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-72 at 163 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (stating 
that “under this definition it clearly would not be sufficient if the protected characteristic was 
incidental or tangential to the persecutor’s motivation” (quoting Asylum and Withholding 
Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (Dec. 7, 2000))). 
 179. In re J-B-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007). 
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the persecution, “[t]hat is, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or 
subordinate to another reason for harm. Rather, it must be a central reason for 
persecuting the respondent.”180 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals largely upheld the Board’s definition of 
“central,” though it excised the word “subordinate,” citing Congress’s choice of the 
phrase “one central reason” as opposed to “the central reason.”181 The court reasoned 
that this language made clear that there may be more than one central reason for 
persecution, and it is irrelevant which of those reasons is most important.182 
Despite the Board’s clarification of the definition of “central,” the courts 
continued to struggle with the analysis of mixed motives asylum cases. For example, 
in Parussimova v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the case 
of Tatyana Parussimova, a native and citizen of Kazakhstan.183 Parussimova testified 
that she was an ethnic Russian and that, while growing up in Kazakhstan, she 
witnessed riots against the Soviet government.184 She faced discrimination as a result 
of her ethnicity, and in 1999 she narrowly escaped a sexual assault.185 In 2005, a 
group of Kazakhs beat and killed her cousin.186 That same year, Parussimova was 
attacked by two Kazakh men.187 She was walking down the street, wearing a pin from 
the American company for which she worked, when the men dragged her into a 
building entryway.188 They told her she “did not have the right to work for an 
American company,” and they pulled the pin off of her clothing.189 Parussimova lost 
consciousness, and when she awoke, the men were kicking her and spitting on her.190 
They called her a “Russian pig” and told her to “get out of their country.”191 They 
attempted to rape her, and when she screamed, a passerby came to her aid.192 The 
passerby called the police, and they took her to the hospital.193 One week later, 
Parussimova saw the same men on the street.194 Her father called the police, who 
arrested the men, but they were apparently released because she saw them again a 
few days later while she was walking with her cousin.195 The men threatened to kill 
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 181. See Ndayshimiye v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) 
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Parussimova because she had reported them to the police.196 Though she escaped, 
they beat her cousin until he was unconscious.197 They threatened her several times 
after this incident.198 Parussimova arrived in the United States in May 2005.199 
The immigration judge denied Parussimova’s application for asylum, finding, 
inter alia, that she had not shown that the treatment she endured occurred on account 
of a protected ground.200 The Board affirmed based on the same reasoning.201 Relying 
on the REAL ID Act’s “one central reason” standard and the Board’s definition of 
“central,” the court of appeals affirmed.202 The court reasoned that the REAL ID 
Act’s “one central reason” requirement led to two conclusions. First, the applicant 
need not show that the protected ground was the only reason for the persecution.203 
Second, the applicant need not show that the protected ground was the “most 
important” reason for the persecution.204 “The Act states that a protected ground must 
constitute ‘at least one’ of the central reasons for persecutory conduct; it does not 
require that such reason account for 51% of the persecutors’ motivation.”205 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the new statutory language imposed a more 
onerous burden than was previously applied by the court, and that “[a] central 
reason—one that is ‘primary,’ ‘essential,’ or ‘principal’—represents more than a 
mere ‘part’ of a persecutor’s motivation.”206 The court held that Parussimova had 
simply not met her burden of proving that her ethnicity played more than a mere part 
in her persecution because it was “simply not clear” whether her ethnicity caused the 
attack or increased its severity.207 It reasoned, “The assailants’ reference to 
Parussimova’s ethnicity in the course of their attack may suggest that such trait 
played a role in this incident. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the utterance of 
an ethnic slur, standing alone, compels the conclusion that her ethnicity was a central 
motivating reason for the attack.”208 
The court’s statement that it was “simply not clear” whether Parussimova’s 
ethnicity caused the attack leads to the inference that it was possible her ethnicity 
caused the attack. The court’s denial of asylum in light of this possibility is troubling 
given that the aim of asylum law is not to punish persecutors, but to provide 
protection for individuals who fear persecution on account of traits they cannot, or 
should be required to, change.209 
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Other courts have similarly struggled with the proper formulation of mixed 
motives claims and the definition of “central” after the REAL ID Act.210 
Moreover, applicants with other types of asylum claims, though not explicitly 
referred to as mixed or multiple motives claims by the Agency or courts, have also 
been denied asylum because the adjudicator identified other, nonprotected reasons 
for the persecution. In domestic violence cases, for example, the Agency has denied 
asylum, reasoning that the abuse occurred on account of the abuser’s desire to control 
the victim or simply because the abuser is a “despicable person” rather than on 
account of the victim’s gender or membership in a particular social group.211 
Similarly, in cases based on fear of forced marriage or human trafficking, 
adjudicators have denied claims, reasoning that economic, personal, or criminal 
considerations motivated the persecution as opposed to the victim’s gender or social 
group membership.212 These cases raise the issue of unconscious motives for the 
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persecution, described above in the antidiscrimination context. The persecutors in 
these cases might not affirmatively list gender or social group membership as 
motivations for their actions (even if speaking truthfully), but it does not follow that 
gender or social group membership did not play a role in the persecution.213 
This Article sets forth a new framework for assessing nexus in mixed motives 
cases and cases involving unconscious motives for persecution—one that is clear, 
that can be consistently applied, and that furthers the goals of asylum. This 
framework is modeled on the frameworks for establishing causation in 
discrimination and, to a lesser extent, tort cases. Accordingly, the next Part discusses 
those frameworks. 
IV. CAUSATION FRAMEWORKS 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) is seen as the main federal 
antidiscrimination statute in the United States. It provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
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were directed at the respondent by her husband to dominate and subdue her, precisely because 
of her gender . . . .”); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 79, at 362 (“It is indisputable that 
women suffer various levels of harm on account of their sex. Gender-based harm includes 
employment discrimination, domestic violence, and rape, as well as forced marriage, female 
genital mutilation, and ‘honor crimes.’”); Gupta, supra note 36, at 406 (noting that trafficking 
and forced marriage overwhelmingly affect females and minors); Lobo, supra note 105, at 361 
(“‘Gender persecution’ refers to women’s persecution qua women, including domestic 
violence, FGC, rape, and forced prostitution.”); Musalo, supra note 119, at 781–82 (“[T]he 
harms inflicted on women were often not considered to be persecution because they were 
condoned or required by culture or religion (e.g., female genital mutilation (FGM), repressive 
social norms), [or] disproportionately inflicted on women (e.g., domestic violence) . . . . 
[W]omen are often persecuted because of their gender, and gender is not one of the five 
grounds in the Convention definition.”); Eileen Overbaugh, Human Trafficking: The Need for 
Federal Prosecution of Accused Traffickers, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 638 (2009) 
(“Approximately 800,000 people are trafficked across national borders each year; the majority 
of these victims are female . . . .” (footnote omitted)); U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Not a Single Girl Should Be Forced to Marry (Oct. 12, 
2012), http://www.ohchr.org/EN /NewsEvents/Pages/IntDayGirlChild.aspx (“Although boys 
and men can also be the victims of forced marriages, the overwhelming majority of those in 
servile marriages are girls and women.”). 
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.214 
In 1973, the Supreme Court set forth a framework for proving intentional 
discrimination under Title VII in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.215 It later clarified 
the framework for mixed motives cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,216 and 
Congress changed the Price Waterhouse rule slightly in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.217 
Although the common law method of proving causation in U.S. tort law is the 
but-for test, this method has been subject to revision for certain types of cases. Because 
the proposal set forth in this Article draws from both U.S. antidiscrimination and tort 
law, this Part discusses the evolution of the applicable frameworks in both areas. 
A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court created a three-part, burden-shifting 
framework for evaluating causation in discrimination cases in which the plaintiff 
alleges that an adverse employment action occurred because of her protected status 
and the defendant claims that the action occurred because of a nondiscriminatory 
reason. Under the framework, the plaintiff alleging discrimination (for example, that 
she was not hired for a job due to her race) must first establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.218 The plaintiff may do so by showing: (i) that she belongs to a racial 
minority; (ii) that she qualified for a job for which she applied and for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that she was rejected despite her 
qualifications; and (iv) that the position remained open after her rejection and the 
employer continued to seek applications from persons with qualifications similar to 
complainant.219 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee’s rejection.”220 Finally, if the defendant is able to do so, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant’s articulated reasons were merely pretext.221 For 
example, the plaintiff could show that white applicants who would also be subject to 
the nondiscriminatory basis stated by the defendant for not hiring the plaintiff were 
nevertheless hired for the job or that the employer had a policy or practice of hiring 
along racial lines.222 
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B. The Price Waterhouse Framework 
McDonnell Douglas did not address the proper framework for assessing claims 
based on mixed motives (that is, cases in which the adverse employment decision was 
based on the applicant’s protected status as well as a nondiscriminatory reason). The 
Supreme Court addressed this issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.223 
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff challenged her employer’s denial of 
partnership, alleging that the employer had discriminated against her on the basis of 
sex.224 The lower courts and Supreme Court found that there was evidence that the 
company had, in fact, engaged in improper stereotyping in making its decision; thus, 
the plaintiff had shown that gender played a part in the employment decision.225 
However, there was also evidence that the plaintiff was lacking in interpersonal 
skills, and the defendant company maintained that it was for this reason that the 
company refused her the partnership.226 The Supreme Court was tasked with 
deciding the proper framework for assessing causation in such a case. 
Price Waterhouse, the defendant, argued that “an employer violates Title VII only 
if it gives decisive consideration to an employee’s gender, race, national origin, or 
religion in making a decision that affects that employee.”227 Under this proposed 
theory, even if the plaintiff successfully showed that a protected trait played a role in 
the adverse employment action, it was still her burden to show that the same action 
would not have been taken absent the protected trait.228 The plaintiff argued, 
however, that once the plaintiff has shown that a protected trait played a role in the 
employment decision, the employer is liable.229 The Supreme Court concluded that 
“the truth lies somewhere in between.”230 
The Court reasoned that because the statute prohibits adverse employment actions 
taken “because of” a protected trait, Congress must have intended that the protected 
trait be irrelevant to employment decisions.231 In other words, employers could not take 
a protected trait into account when making employment decisions.232 Accordingly, the 
Court reasoned that the defendant erred when it construed “because of” as a shorthand 
for “but-for causation.”233 The Court also reasoned that “‘because of’ do[es] not mean 
‘solely because of,’” and concluded that “Title VII meant to condemn even those 
decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”234 It 
therefore held that once the plaintiff shows that a protected trait played a “motivating 
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part” in an employment decision, the defendant can only avoid liability by showing 
that absent the protected trait, the same action would have been taken.235 
Significantly, the Court did not require the plaintiff to “identify the precise causal 
role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision 
she challenges.”236 She need only show that the employer relied upon protected 
trait-based considerations when coming to its decision.237 
As set forth above, the Court explained that by “motivating factor,” the Court 
meant that “if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons 
were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the 
applicant or employee was a woman.”238 
The Court also addressed briefly the types of evidence the plaintiff might use to 
make such a showing. It stated, for example, that remarks about stereotypes on the 
part of the defendant could serve as evidence that the protected trait played a role in 
the employment decision.239 However, it refrained from setting forth the precise 
parameters of a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden. 
The Court stated that the employer could not meet its burden simply by showing 
that the decision was motivated only in part by a legitimate reason. “The very premise 
of a mixed-motives case is that a legitimate reason was present . . . . The employer 
instead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it 
to make the same decision.”240 
Scholars agree that in such mixed motives cases, the Court essentially shifted the 
burden of proving but-for causation (or lack thereof) from the plaintiff to the defendant.241 
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 Framework 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to provide that “an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”242 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. Id. at 250. 
 236. Id. at 241. 
 237. Id. at 241–42. 
 238. Id. at 250. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. at 252. 
 241. See White & Krieger, supra note 107, at 504 (“This approach essentially shifted to 
the defendant the burden of proving that sex was not the but-for cause of its decision.”); see 
also William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal To Let 
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 471 (2013) (“First, the 
plaintiff was required to prove—as the prima facie case—that the relevant protected 
characteristic was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. If the plaintiff 
successfully proved the first step, the burden of persuasion then shifted to the defendant to 
prove that it would have taken the same action in the absence of a discriminatory motive (the 
same-decision defense).”); Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 643, 643 (2008) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) 
as recognizing “a burden-shifting mechanism by which plaintiffs can prove ‘motivating factor’ 
causation and thereby shift the burden to defendants to prove a lack of ‘but for’ causation”). 
 242. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
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Under the Act and consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Price 
Waterhouse, the plaintiff must first prove that the protected trait played a “motivating 
factor” in bringing about the adverse employment action.243 The burden then shifts to 
the defendant to show that the “same action” would have been made absent the 
protected characteristic.244 However, contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Price 
Waterhouse, even if the defendant successfully shows that the same action would have 
been taken absent consideration of the protected characteristic, liability attaches; a 
successful defense merely reduces the damages available to the plaintiff.245 
The Supreme Court thereafter clarified that in proving that a protected trait was a 
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision, the plaintiff bringing a Title 
VII claim need not provide direct evidence; circumstantial evidence could be 
sufficient.246 In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the plaintiff provided evidence that 
“(1) she was singled out for ‘intense stalking’ by one of her supervisors, (2) she 
received harsher discipline than men for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less 
favorably than men in the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly 
‘stack[ed]’ her disciplinary record and ‘frequently used or tolerated’ sex-based slurs 
against her.”247 The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to provide direct 
evidence that gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision and 
accordingly objected to the mixed motive instruction given to the jury.248 The court 
gave the instruction over the defendant’s objection, and the Supreme Court affirmed, 
finding that nothing in the statute suggested that the plaintiff can only meet the 
“motivating factor” requirement through direct evidence.249 
D. Causation Frameworks in Tort Law 
To succeed on a tort claim for negligence, the plaintiff must prove not only 
negligent breach on behalf of the defendant but also causation. The test most often 
used to determine causation in the tort context is the but-for test, which asks whether, 
but for the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would have been harmed; if not, 
causation is established.250 In other words, if the defendant’s negligence was a 
necessary element in causing the plaintiff’s harm, then the negligence is a cause in 
fact of the harm. 
                                                                                                                 
 
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (West 2014)). 
 243. See id.; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989). 
 244. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 245. See id. It appears that Congress felt it important to hold defendants liable in such 
circumstances, even if the plaintiff was not entitled to damages, in order to fulfill the 
antidiscrimination objectives of Title VII. See S. REP. NO. 101-315, 24 (1990) (“If Title VII’s 
ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, proven victims of discrimination 
must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of discrimination must be held liable for their 
actions.”). 
 246. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–100 (2003). 
 247. Id. at 96 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 248. See id. at 96–97. 
 249. See id. at 97, 101–02. 
 250. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1775 (1985). 
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The but-for test is employed in the majority of cases as a routine matter, but some 
cases have led to exceptions to this general rule of causation. For example, some 
courts have found causation even when there were multiple causes of the harm, each 
of which would have been sufficient to cause the harm on its own.251 To illustrate, if 
two fires set in two different areas converge to burn down the plaintiff’s house, even 
if either one of the fires alone would have burned down the house, both fires may be 
seen as factual causes.252 This is true even if one of the fires was set negligently and 
the other was an act of nature.253 The Third Restatement of Torts sets forth the rule as 
follows: “If multiple acts occur, each of which . . . alone would have been a factual 
cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act 
is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”254 
Another exception to the but-for rule that bears noting is the “loss of chance” 
doctrine or the “lost chance” rule. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound 
provides an illustration of the rule.255 In that case, a lung cancer patient initially had a 
39% chance of survival, but because of a negligent misdiagnosis by a doctor, his chance 
of survival was reduced to 25%.256 Clearly, the plaintiff could not show that but for the 
doctor’s negligence, the patient would have survived, since his chance of survival to 
begin with was less than 50%. Nevertheless, because the doctor’s negligent actions 
increased the chances of death, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to let 
a jury decide whether the doctor’s negligence and the ensuing increased risk of death 
was a “substantial factor” in causing the patient’s death.257 
Summers v. Tice provides another example of an alternative to the but-for test.258 
In that case, the plaintiff was on a hunting trip with the two defendants when both 
defendants negligently fired their shotguns.259 The plaintiff was struck and injured, 
but he was unable to prove which of the defendants caused the injury or whether both 
caused the injury (he was hit by at least two pellets).260 Thus, while it was clear that 
at least one of the defendants had injured the plaintiff, neither of the defendants was 
more likely than the other to have caused the injury.261 Nevertheless, the court ruled 
in favor of the plaintiff.262 It shifted the burden of proof to each of the defendants to 
show that the other had caused the injury, and if neither could, both would be held 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. See, e.g., Vincent v. Fairbanks Mem’l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847, 851–53 (Alaska 1993); 
Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878–79 (Cal. 1991). 
 252. See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 179 N.W. 45, 49 
(Minn. 1920), overruled in part by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (1921) 
(stating that, in the case of a negligently set fire combined with a fire of unknown origin, 
negligent fire setter can be held liable for all damage); Joshi v. Providence Health Sys. 149 
P.3d 1164, 1169 (Or. 2006). 
 253. See Anderson, 179 N.W. at 48. 
 254. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 (2010). 
 255. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983). 
 256. See id. at 475. 
 257. See id. at 487. 
 258. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
 259. See id. at 1–2. 
 260. See id. at 2–3. 
 261. See id. at 5. 
 262. See id. 
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jointly and severally liable.263 In so holding, the court relied on “reasons of policy 
and justice,” stating, “where the matter of apportionment is incapable of proof, the 
innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress.”264 
V. THE PROPOSED RULE 
This Article borrows from principles of antidiscrimination and tort law to propose 
a rule for demonstrating causation, or nexus, in asylum cases. To be clear, this rule 
addresses only the causation prong of the asylum law analysis. An asylum applicant 
would first have to show that she formerly experienced or presently fears harm that 
rises to the level of persecution,265 and she would then have to show that she 
possesses a trait protected by the Act.266 Much has been written on these subjects, 
particularly the latter,267 and the proposal set forth in this Article does nothing to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 263. See id. at 2–3. 
 264. Id. at 5. 
 265. See, e.g., Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The statute does not 
supply a definition of ‘persecution,’ but we have repeatedly described it as punishment or the 
infliction of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize 
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detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of 
property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Bradvica v. INS, 128 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Persecution is not defined 
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harassment does not amount to persecution.”); Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 583 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (“The harm or suffering need not be physical, but may take other forms, such as the 
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, 
housing, employment or other essentials of life.” (quoting In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 
433, 456–57 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985))); Fatin v. 
INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) (“‘[P]ersecution’ is an extreme concept that does not 
include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”). 
 266. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2014) (defining a refugee as “any person who is 
outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”). 
 267. See, e.g., Leonard Birdsong, A Legislative Rejoinder to “Give Me Your Gays, Your 
Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual 
Persecution . . . ,” 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197, 208 (2008) (arguing for a 
reconceptualization of the refugee definition to include a clear definition of persecution to 
better aid those seeking asylum based on sexual persecution); Wendy B. Davis & Angela D. 
Atchue, No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying a Safe Haven for Refugees, 5 TEX. F. ON C.L. 
& C.R. 81, 85 (2000) (examining how the federal circuit courts have defined persecution and 
applied the definition while denying asylum to certain asylum seekers); Stephen M. Knight, 
Shielded from Review: The Questionable Birth and Development of the Asylum Standard of 
Review Under Elias-Zacarias, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 133, 141 (2005) (noting that the Supreme 
Court of the United States reframed the asylum analysis in Elias-Zacaraias, particularly 
pertaining to the applicant’s political beliefs or those imputed to her); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 379 (2007) (“[T]here has never been a succinct, definitive 
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change these burdens. This Article sets forth a framework for establishing a link 
between the two—a framework, in other words, for determining whether the 
persecution occurred “on account of” the protected trait. 
In a previous article, I demonstrated that there is currently no clear framework for 
assessing nexus in asylum cases and that this lack of guidance with respect to nexus 
has led to inconsistent and unfair results in many cases, particularly those involving 
gender-based or private harms.268 I proposed a rule for assessing nexus in most cases; 
the proposed rule was modeled closely after the but-for rule, which, as set forth 
above, has traditionally been used to determine causation in tort law.269 The but-for 
rule has also been held to be a sufficient method for proving causation in 
antidiscrimination law.270 My proposed rule for determining nexus in asylum cases 
stated that an applicant could establish nexus by showing that but for the protected 
characteristic, it is more likely than not that the persecution would not have occurred 
or would not occur in the future.271 I stated that this rule could be employed to 
accurately determine nexus in the vast majority of asylum cases.272 
As I also stated, and as is clear from the discussion above regarding causation 
analyses that have evolved in antidiscrimination and tort law, this framework may 
not be appropriate for all cases, particularly those involving mixed or multiple 
motives. While other commentators have suggested looking to antidiscrimination 
law for guidance with respect to nexus,273 this Article is the first to propose a 
burden-shifting framework inspired by U.S. antidiscrimination and tort law. This rule 
would obviate the need for the “one central reason” language of the REAL ID Act,274 
language that is at best unhelpful and at worst violates the spirit of the Refugee 
Convention.275 
                                                                                                                 
 
definition of ‘persecution,’ because the nature of persecution and our understanding of it keep 
changing.”). See generally Lobo, supra note 105 (arguing for the inclusion of women in the 
enumerated particular social group); Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social 
Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum 
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47 (2008) 
(rejecting the BIA’s “social visibility” requirement of the particular social group protected 
ground); Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against 
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based 
on Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281 (2002) (arguing that the particular social 
group analysis should encompass gender-based claims); Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 
2013 UTAH L. REV. 283 (arguing for a comprehensive definition of persecution). 
 268. Gupta, supra note 36, at 380–81. 
 269. Id. at 422–23. 
 270. See id. at 428; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) 
(holding that in the age discrimination contexts, the courts should apply a but-for test); Katz, 
supra note 241, at 653 (“Courts that require litigants to use the McDonnell Douglas framework 
probably intend to require ‘but for’ causation for all purposes (liability, as well as damages), 
and to place the full burden of proving ‘but for’ causation on the plaintiff.”). 
 271. Gupta, supra note 36, at 439. 
 272. Id.  
 273. See Foster, supra note 31, at 318–34; James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Causal 
Connection (“Nexus”) to a Convention Ground, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 469 (2003). 
 274. REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 275. See, e.g., Ndayshimiye v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 129–31 (3d Cir. 2009) 
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The proposed rule would operate as follows. First, pursuant to the proposal set 
forth in my previous article, if an applicant is able to show that but for the protected 
characteristic it is more likely than not that the persecution would not have occurred, 
nexus is established and the court need not do any further nexus analysis. In cases in 
which it is not possible for an applicant to prove but-for causation, an applicant can 
make out a prima facie case for nexus by showing (through direct or circumstantial 
evidence) that the protected trait played a role in the persecution. At that point, the 
burden shifts to the DHS to show that the persecution would have occurred (or would 
occur in the future) for some other nonprotected reason, even absent the protected 
trait. If the DHS cannot make this showing, nexus is established. If the DHS 
successfully makes this showing, the burden shifts back to the applicant to show one 
of three things: (1) that even absent the DHS’s proffered reason for the persecution, 
the persecution would have occurred; (2) that the likelihood of the persecution 
increased because of the protected trait; or (3) that the severity of the persecution 
increased because of the protected trait. If the applicant is able to show any of these 
three things, nexus is established. 
This rule, the reasoning behind each part, and a description of the types of evidence 
that would be relevant to the analysis are discussed in further detail in this Part. 
A. The Rule 
Under the rule proposed in this Article, the applicant can make out a prima facie 
case for nexus by showing that the protected trait played a role in bringing about the 
persecution. Although this prong of the analysis is inspired by U.S. 
antidiscrimination law, I decline to adopt the “motivating factor” language from the 
discrimination cases and statute because this language unnecessarily emphasizes the 
intent of the discriminator or persecutor. As described above, intent is difficult to 
prove in discrimination cases, but it is even more difficult to prove in asylum cases 
where the persecutor is not in the country, let alone the courtroom. Moreover, as 
other scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s statement that a motivating factor is 
one that would be identified by the persecutor in a “truthful response”276 is 
                                                                                                                 
 
(holding that the BIA misinterpreted the “one central reason” standard by using the word 
“subordinate” in its interpretation); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 
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least in part’ standard we previously applied.”); In re J-B-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 
2007) (explaining “one central reason” language by examining Congressional intent and 
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a Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 61, 97 (2009) (finding 
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http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/05/immigrants-rights-under-attack-house-bill-hr-10. 
 276. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
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problematic because it ignores the concept of unconscious discrimination.277 
Similarly, in the persecution context, some motives for persecution are unconscious 
for the persecutor and unacknowledged by the courts. For example, if an abuser were 
asked why he was abusing his wife, even if answering truthfully, he may not answer 
that it was because of her gender, notwithstanding the well-documented relationship 
between gender and domestic violence.278 Finally, in a discrimination case, the 
defendant’s liability is at issue; accordingly, it makes sense to inquire into the 
defendant’s motives. The goal of asylum law, on the other hand, is not to punish the 
persecutor but to protect the applicant from persecution based on traits the applicant 
either cannot change or should not be required to change. Accordingly, the focus 
should be on the status of the victim and whether that status led to the persecution.279 
An applicant could establish this prima facie prong by producing either direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the trait led to (or would lead to) the persecution. The 
types of evidence an applicant could use would not differ from the types of evidence 
applicants routinely use in asylum cases today. For example, the applicant could use 
as evidence statements made by the persecutor directly to the applicant;280 statements 
made by the persecutor to others, such as the media; the prevalence of persecution 
against members of the applicant’s protected class (for example, evidence that 95% 
of the individuals persecuted by a government are from a certain ethnic group or 
evidence that 95% of the victims of sex trafficking in a country are women of a 
certain age group); evidence that the state fails to protect members of the protected 
class; or other circumstantial evidence (for example, that the persecutor targets parts 
of the country that are heavily inhabited by members of a certain ethnic group).281 
                                                                                                                 
 
 277. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 126, at 271 (noting that “discrimination that affects 
upper-level women is often unintentional and unconscious.”); White & Krieger, supra note 
107, at 509 (“That ‘unconscious’ discrimination frequently occurs is well documented; many 
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 278. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against 
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and domestic violence across the world); Copelon, supra note 129, at 303–05 (“Domestic 
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structural, a mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is built upon male superiority and 
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 279. See Gupta, supra note 36, at 430 (“The focus . . . should be on the status or perceived 
status of the applicant and whether that status is an actual cause of the persecution.” (footnote 
omitted)); Musalo, supra note 82, at 1181–82 (“In such a context, the inquiry should be on the 
effect of persecution on the victim and not on the intent of the persecutor.”). 
 280. See In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A. 1996) (An applicant can demonstrate 
motive through five different approaches, including “[i]ndications in the particular case that 
the abuse was directed toward modifying or punishing opinion rather than conduct (e.g., 
statements or actions by the perpetrators or abuse out of proportion to nonpolitical ends).”). 
 281. It is worth noting that these types of evidence roughly parallel the types of evidence 
routinely accepted in discrimination cases. See, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 125, at 1059–60. 
Krieger and Fiske listed types of evidence of causation accepted in discrimination cases, including: 
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The ability to use such circumstantial evidence to prove a prima facie case is 
especially important in cases involving unconscious or unacknowledged motives for 
the persecution—such as domestic violence cases. Because abusers, even if speaking 
truthfully, may not list gender as a motivating factor for the abuse, victims of 
domestic violence may have a difficult time providing direct evidence of nexus to 
gender. But if an applicant is able to offer evidence demonstrating that the vast 
majority of victims of domestic violence in the home country are women or that the 
state fails to protect women on the basis of gender, she will be able to meet her prima 
facie burden.282 
Once an applicant has made out a prima facie showing of nexus, the burden then 
shifts to the DHS to show that, even absent the protected trait, the persecution would 
have occurred for some other nonprotected reason. This prong mirrors the 
requirement in discrimination cases that the defendant show that the same adverse 
employment action would have been taken for a legitimate reason, even absent the 
protected trait. Under this proposal, however, the DHS is not required to prove that 
the nonprotected reason is “legitimate.” Unlike adverse employment decisions, 
which can be taken for a variety of reasons, some legitimate and some not, acts rising 
to the level of persecution will rarely be carried out for “legitimate” reasons.283 
Nevertheless, not every act of persecution leads to asylum eligibility; a persecutory 
act must be performed on account of a protected ground if asylum protection is to be 
                                                                                                                 
 
Comparative evidence showing whether similarly situated persons not in the 
plaintiff’s protected group were treated more favorably than the plaintiff or other 
members of the plaintiff’s group; Statements or expressive conduct by decision 
makers evincing negative stereotypes or attitudes toward the plaintiff or others 
in his or her protected group; The employer’s willingness to tolerate harassment 
of the plaintiff or other members of the plaintiff’s protected group; The 
employer’s general pattern of treatment of members of the plaintiff’s group, 
including statistical evidence; The specific decision maker’s treatment of 
plaintiff and other members of the plaintiff’s protected group . . . .  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 282. Gender is not one of the five protected grounds. However, many formulations of the 
particular social group ground accepted by courts include gender as a component. See, e.g., 
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2013) (“young women who are targeted for 
prostitution by traffickers in Albania” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Kasinga, 21 
I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (“[T]he applicant is a member of a social group consisting 
of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that 
tribe, and who oppose the practice.”). Moreover, many scholars have argued that gender 
should be a protected ground. See, e.g., Jenny-Brooke Condon, Asylum Law’s Gender 
Paradox, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 250 (2002) (calling for a sixth category of protected 
grounds for women facing gendered persecution). See generally Lobo, supra note 105 
(advocating for United States asylum law to recognize gender as a protected ground); Randall, 
supra note 267 (arguing that the particular social group analysis should encompass gender 
based claims). Whether or not gender should be a protected ground is beyond the scope of this 
Article. As I argued in the previous article, however, even if gender were accepted as a 
protected ground, in many cases, claims based on gender would nevertheless fail on nexus 
grounds. Gupta, supra note 36, at 447. I use gender as an example here to illustrate how the 
rule proposed in this Article would help to open up eligibility for asylum to applicants with 
gender-based claims. 
 283. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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granted. In carrying out its burden, the DHS may use the same types of evidence an 
applicant may use in making out a prima facie case. 
Allowing the DHS an opportunity to prove that the persecution would have 
occurred absent the protected ground makes some sense. Some scholars have argued 
that in order to prove nexus, an applicant need only show that the protected trait was 
a “contributing factor” to the risk of being persecuted.284 This test is similar to the 
prima facie test proposed in this Article. However, evidence proffered by an 
applicant might lead an adjudicator to believe that the protected trait was a 
contributing cause of the persecution, even if it was not so. For example, suppose an 
applicant is imprisoned for a nonprotected reason. While in prison, one of the captors 
makes derogatory comments about the applicant’s race to the applicant. Taken out of 
context, these comments could be seen as evidence that the applicant’s race was a 
contributing cause of the persecution. The DHS might be able to provide evidence, 
however, that the applicant was imprisoned for the nonprotected reason, and others not 
of the applicant’s race were imprisoned for the same reason and suffered the same 
severity and duration of persecution as the applicant. In this way, the DHS could prove 
that the derogatory comments did not lead to the persecution but were in fact part of 
the persecution. This step, therefore, effectively allows the DHS an opportunity to rebut 
the applicant’s evidence that the protected trait caused the persecution.285 
This part of the test might have changed the result in the Parussimova case, 
described above. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
the evidence Parussimova presented suggested that her Russian ethnicity “played a 
role” in the persecution,286 it nevertheless found that she had not established nexus 
because it was “simply not clear” whether her ethnicity caused the attack or increased 
its severity.287 Under the proposed rule, the evidence presented by Parussimova 
might have been sufficient to make out a prima facie case. The burden would have 
then shifted to the DHS to show that she would have been persecuted even if she 
were not Russian. If the DHS could not make that showing, the nexus requirement 
would have been met. Such a result is in line with the aims of asylum law. Notably, 
the court did not find that Parussimova’s ethnicity did not cause the persecution; it 
merely found that it was “simply not clear” that it did.288 That phrasing leaves open 
                                                                                                                 
 
 284. See Foster, supra note 31, at 338 (“[T]he Convention ground need not be shown to be 
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risk. Attribution of the Convention ground to the applicant by the state or non-governmental 
agent of persecution is sufficient to establish the required causal connection.”). 
 285. Of course, the DHS could present such evidence even if the contributing factor 
standard were applied. However, the approach proposed in this Article would afford the DHS 
a more formal opportunity for rebuttal and would focus immigration judges and the Board 
toward a systematic assessment of the evidence presented from both sides. 
 286. Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 287. Id. 
 288. See id. 
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the possibility that her ethnicity did, in fact, cause the persecution, and therefore 
might lead to her being persecuted in the future. Given that the goal of asylum is to 
protect individuals from persecution, not to punish persecutors,289 the benefit of any 
error in determining causation should go to the applicant, particularly when the 
applicant has already shown that a protected trait played a role in the persecution.290 
If the DHS is unable to meet its burden, nexus is established. If, on the other hand, 
the DHS successfully shows that the persecution would have occurred for another 
nonprotected reason even absent the protected ground, the burden shifts back to the 
applicant to show one of three things: (1) the persecution would have occurred (or 
would occur in the future) absent the DHS’s proffered reason for the persecution; 
(2) the likelihood of the persecution occurring increased due to the existence of the 
protected trait; or (3) the severity of the persecution increased due to the existence of 
the protected trait. These three possible rebuttals merit some explanation. 
The first possible rebuttal—that the persecution would have occurred (or would 
occur in the future) absent the DHS’s proffered reason for the persecution—is a loose 
analogy to the opportunity afforded to plaintiffs under McDonnell Douglas to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was pretext.291 Of course, it makes 
no sense to ask whether the nonprotected reason for the persecution given by the 
DHS is pretext since the DHS is not the persecutor. However, this proposed rebuttal 
takes into account the possibility of multiple sufficient causes. Suppose, for example, 
that it is well documented that a certain dictator targets all Asians (a protected 
ground) and all bus drivers (a nonprotected ground)292 for persecution. The applicant, 
who happens to be an Asian bus driver, will be able to make out a prima facie case 
for nexus to a protected ground. The DHS, however, will then be able to show that 
the persecution would have occurred or would occur in the future on account of the 
nonprotected ground, even absent the protected ground. Were the applicant not 
allowed to offer a rebuttal in this situation, Asians would be eligible for asylum while 
Asian bus drivers, who possess not one but two targeted characteristics, would not 
be. Such a result would be unjust. Allowing the applicant the opportunity to prove 
                                                                                                                 
 
 289. See, e.g., In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996) (“It is . . . important to 
remember that a grant of political asylum is a benefit to an individual under asylum law, not a 
judgment against the country in question.”). 
 290. See id. (“In adjudicating mixed motive cases, it is important to keep in mind the 
fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law. . . . Such an approach is designed to afford 
a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.”). 
 291. 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973). 
 292. There is some debate about whether membership in a profession can constitute 
membership in a particular social group for asylum purposes. See, e.g., Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 
469 F.3d 1082, 1088 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that “uncorrupt prosecutors [from Ukraine] who 
were subjected to persecution for exposing government corruption” do not meet the 
requirements of a particular social group); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985) 
(suggesting that an unskilled taxi driver could change jobs or cooperate with guerrillas to avoid 
persecution because the persecution he was subjected to was on account of his profession, not 
membership in a protected social group). But see Rojas-Contreras v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 
188 F. App’x 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2006) (remanding to the Board to determine whether “health 
care professionals” can be a cognizable particular social group). For purposes of this 
illustration, however, the reader is asked to assume that the status of being a bus driver is not 
a protected status under the Act. 
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that the persecution would occur even absent the DHS’s proffered nonprotected 
reason for the persecution would avoid this problem. 
This part of the analysis differs from the analysis in antidiscrimination law where 
the concept of multiple sufficient causes might aid the defendant in avoiding liability 
or damages. For example, suppose it is well documented that an employer refuses to 
hire individuals from a certain minority group. Suppose that same employer 
legitimately refuses to hire any individual who has not passed a licensing exam in 
the employer’s trade. A plaintiff who is a member of the minority group and who did 
not pass the licensing exam would be able to assert a prima facie case; nevertheless, 
the defendant would be able to avoid damages by offering the failure to pass the 
licensing exam as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to 
hire.293 This difference points to an important distinction between antidiscrimination 
law and asylum law: the result of a discrimination case is to assign liability to the 
defendant (either in the form of damages or injunctive relief),294 but a plaintiff who 
legitimately should not have been hired should not be entitled to damages or 
injunctive relief. On the other hand, the result of a grant of asylum is protection from 
persecution, and an applicant should be protected if she would be persecuted on 
account of a Convention ground, even if a persecutor may have other 
non-Convention reasons to persecute her.295 
The second possible rebuttal for an applicant—that the likelihood of being 
persecuted increased due to the existence of the protected ground—is inspired by the 
“loss of chance” rule in torts. The Gafoor case, described above, provides an 
opportunity for illustration. Suppose Gafoor were able to make out a prima facie 
showing of nexus. Indeed, the court of appeals was convinced that there was “no 
doubt that the soldiers were motivated, at least in part, by his Indian background and 
by his purported opposition to the army.”296 The DHS might nevertheless be able to 
show that Gafoor would have been persecuted even absent his ethnicity because he 
had arrested a high-ranking government official. Perhaps the DHS could provide 
                                                                                                                 
 
 293. See, e.g., Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 215–16 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying a mixed 
motive framework where a Muslim-American aviation security expert had his security clearance 
revoked and then was suspended from working because of the resulting lack of clearance). 
 294. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (West 2014); 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1981a(a)(1) (West 2014). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 only provided for equitable relief, 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g); however, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
provided for punitive and compensatory damages if “the complaining party demonstrates that 
the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or 
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual,” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(1). 
 295. See, e.g., Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying asylum 
because the rape the applicant was subjected to was “but an act of random violence”); Michelle 
A. McKinley, Cultural Culprits, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 91, 94 (2013) 
(“Proponents of female genital cutting may hold culturally endorsed motivations for 
modifying the genitalia of young girls, and their actions may be legal within their natal 
communities . . . .”); Martina Pomeroy, Left Out in the Cold: Trafficking Victims, Gender, and 
Misinterpretation of the Refugee Convention’s “Nexus” Requirement, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 453, 477–78 (2010) (showing that, for example, a trafficker may not be motivated by 
harming the trafficking victim but is motivated by an economic incentive). 
 296. Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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evidence demonstrating that officers who were ethnically Fijian were similarly 
persecuted if they arrested high-ranking army officials. Gafoor might still be able to 
establish nexus by showing that the chances of his being persecuted were increased 
due to his ethnicity. For example, if the DHS showed that just over half of the Fijians 
who arrested high-ranking army officials were persecuted, Gafoor could establish 
nexus to a protected ground by showing that all (or nearly all) of the Indians who 
arrested high-ranking army officials were persecuted. Just as a reduction in chance 
of survival gives rise to an inference of a connection between a doctor’s negligence 
and a patient’s death in a tort matter, a showing in an asylum case of an increased 
likelihood of persecution would point to an obvious connection between the 
persecution and the Convention ground. 
Gafoor can also be used to illustrate the third possible rebuttal—that the severity 
of the persecution increased or would increase due to the existence of the protected 
trait.297 Suppose again that Gafoor made out a prima facie showing of nexus, and the 
DHS successfully demonstrated that ethnic Fijians who arrested high-ranking 
government officials were also persecuted. Gafoor might still be able to establish 
nexus by showing that his ethnicity increased the severity of the persecution to which 
he was or would be subjected. Gafoor might offer evidence showing that while ethnic 
Fijians who arrested high-ranking army officers were detained for a few days and 
beaten, ethnic Indians in the same situation were detained for lengthier periods of 
time and were beaten more severely or even tortured. This rebuttal provision is 
consistent with asylum law. In order to make out a claim for asylum, an applicant must 
show that he experienced harm that rose to the level of persecution and that the 
persecution occurred on account of a Convention ground.298 It stands to reason, then, 
that if an applicant who would have been persecuted absent the Convention ground can 
demonstrate that he experienced additional harms that rose to the level of persecution 
solely because of the Convention ground, he should be eligible for asylum.299 
B. Possible Critiques 
A possible critique of the proposal set forth in this Article is that once the applicant 
has made a prima facie showing of nexus, the burden of proof shifts to the DHS, a 
party to which all of the applicable evidence may not be readily available.300 It makes 
sense in the antidiscrimination context to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 297. This rebuttal has no corollary in antidiscrimination law in the disparate treatment 
context because typically in such cases there either is an adverse employment action or there 
is not. Whether or not the adverse employment action could have been more severe is 
accordingly not an issue. 
 298. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2014). 
 299. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit appeared to acknowledge as much in Parussimova. In 
finding that Parussimova had not established nexus, it reasoned in part, “it is simply not clear 
whether Parussimova’s ethnicity, as opposed to one of the other possible motives evinced by 
the record, caused the assailants to initiate their attack or increase its severity once it had 
begun.” Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 300. See Katz, supra note 241, at 655 (“In the law of evidence, it is common to place the 
burden of proving a particular fact on a party who controls the means for proving that fact.”). 
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the party that is in the best position to provide evidence as to its own motives.301 But 
the DHS is not the persecutor, and arguably the DHS has no more access to evidence 
of the persecutor’s motives than does the applicant.302 Accordingly, it is 
inappropriate to place such a burden on the DHS. 
It is important to note, however, that a burden-shifting framework such as the one 
proposed in this Article would not be new to asylum law. As set forth in Part I, under 
the asylum statute, the applicant has the burden of proving eligibility for asylum.303 
However, once an applicant demonstrates that she has suffered past persecution, she 
is entitled to a presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.304 
The burden then shifts to the DHS to rebut that presumption by showing that there 
has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that she no longer has a 
well-founded fear of future persecution or that she could avoid persecution by 
relocating to a different part of the country.305 The “fundamental change in 
circumstances” pertains to any change in circumstances, whether a change in the 
conditions of the country from which the applicant fled or a change in the applicant’s 
personal circumstances.306 With respect to a change in the applicant’s personal 
circumstances, the DHS is certainly not in the best position to provide that 
information; nevertheless, once an applicant has shown past persecution, it is the 
DHS’s burden to do so. With respect to a change in country conditions, the DHS is 
arguably in a better position to provide such evidence because, unlike the applicant, 
the DHS litigates thousands of asylum cases every year and has access to banks of 
information regarding country conditions.307 But this is also the case with respect to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 301. See id. (“The access-to-proof argument, combined with defendant’s wrongdoing, 
provide a strong case for making the defendant bear the burden of proof on the issue of ‘but 
for’ causation once a plaintiff has proven ‘motivating factor’ causation.”); see also Darlene D. 
Bullock, Case Note, The Order and Allocation of Proof in Mixed-Motive Discrimination 
Cases: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 2 GEO. MASON U. C. R. L.J. 117, 128 (1991) (“This 
burden-shifting structure is logical and procedurally efficient. Because the [defendant] made 
the decision, only he knows whether his reason for the adverse employment decision was 
legitimate. The defendant therefore is the least-cost provider of this information.”). 
 302. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (2014); see also Tasha Wiesman, Denying Relief to the 
Persecutor: An Argument in Favor of Adopting the Dissenting Opinion of Negusie v. Holder, 
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 559, 578–79 (2011) (The Agency is required to keep the fact of an 
individual’s asylum application confidential from the home country, thereby making 
“investigations into claims made by an applicant . . . difficult to conduct because of the 
confidentiality issues associated with asylum.”). 
 303. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
 304. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). 
 305. See id. 
 306. See Singh v. Holder, 656 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the 
applicant’s wife’s arrest could constitute a fundamental change in circumstances); 
Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that both a change 
in country conditions and a change in an applicant’s personal circumstances can satisfy the 
definition of a “fundamental change in circumstances”). 
 307. See Adam L. Fleming, Around the World in the INA: Designing a Country of Removal 
in Immigration Proceedings, 7 IMMIGR. LAW ADVISOR 1 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office 
for Immigration Review, D.C.), May 2013, at 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir
/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%202013/vol7no5.pdf (“Every year the Department of Homeland 
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circumstantial evidence of persecutor motive. For example, in a case involving 
persecution by government officials from country X, the DHS may be able to provide 
evidence it amassed in other cases involving country X that tends to show that the 
government agents routinely persecute individuals not on account of the applicant’s 
protected status but for some other nonprotected reason. 
Moreover, the risk that nexus might be overdetermined due to the DHS’s lack of 
access to evidence of persecutor motive is a justified one for at least three reasons. 
First, as mentioned earlier, the goal of asylum law is to protect individuals who will 
be persecuted upon return to their home countries. In order to reach the nexus prong, 
an applicant must prove that she is a member of a protected class of persons. She 
must also prove that she was subjected to persecution or has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.308 Although there is some debate as to what type of conduct rises 
to the level of persecution, it is generally understood that persecution is more severe 
than mere discrimination or harassment.309 In many cases, asylum seekers are fleeing 
the threat of torture or even death.310 Under the approach set forth in this Article, the 
applicant would also have shown that her protected status played a role in the 
persecution. To the extent that there is error with respect to the nexus determination, 
such error would only benefit an individual who had successfully made those 
showings. Accordingly, it is appropriate for the error to be made in favor of the 
applicant, as opposed to against the applicant, given that the stakes are so high and 
the consequences of wrongful deportation are so dire.311 
Second, in discrimination cases, a defendant’s liability is at issue. So to the extent 
there is an error in assessment of blame, not only is the defendant punished for having 
carried out a legitimate employment action but the plaintiff is rewarded for having been 
legitimately fired. A grant of asylum, however, does not punish the persecutor or 
impose judgment on the home country.312 Accordingly, in asylum cases, there is no 
risk of unfair punishment to the persecutor or the applicant’s home country. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Security removes hundreds of thousands of aliens from the United States . . . .”). 
 308. For this reason, any concern that the proposed nexus framework would open the 
floodgates to a large amount of asylum seekers is unfounded. See Gupta, supra note 36, at 454. 
 309. See supra note 265.  
 310. See, e.g., Garces v. Mukasey, 312 F. App’x 12, 13–14 (9th Cir. 2009) (The applicant 
and her family received telephonic death threats several times a day due to her political 
membership, and the applicant was then physically threatened by an armed assailant.); Nuru 
v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (For twenty-five days, the applicant was tied 
up, naked and bound in the “helicopter” position, and left outside in the hot desert sun. He was 
forced to urinate and defecate in this bound position, and he was regularly beaten and whipped 
until the skin broke open on his back and feet.). 
 311. See, e.g., In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996) (“Such an approach is 
designed to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.”). In a different 
context, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to have acknowledged the need to give asylum 
applicants the benefit of any doubt. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court rejected the 
argument that applicants for asylum must prove that they “more likely than not” will be 
persecuted; instead, the Court suggested that even a 10 percent likelihood of persecution could 
be sufficient for asylum purposes. 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
 312. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 492 (“A decision to grant asylum is not an unfriendly act 
precisely because it is not a judgment about the country involved, but a judgment about the 
reasonableness of the applicant’s belief that persecution was based on a protected ground.”). 
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Third, in discrimination cases, the offending harm (for example, dismissal from 
employment or refusal to hire) often would be lawful absent discriminatory motive. 
On the other hand, harms that rise to the level of persecution (for example, rape, 
torture, beatings, imprisonment without due process, etc.) are generally not lawful 
(at least under U.S. law), even absent nexus to a Convention ground. Accordingly, 
to the extent an asylum applicant has a relative advantage over a plaintiff in a 
discrimination action, that advantage seems justified. The reasoning behind the 
Summers v. Tice rule in tort law supports this conclusion. Just as the court in that 
case determined that sound policy reasons counsel giving the benefit of the doubt to 
the innocent plaintiff over the negligent defendants,313 in refugee law, the benefit of 
the doubt should go to the applicant who has shown that she was persecuted (or fears 
persecution).314 
CONCLUSION 
The guidance provided to adjudicators as to the proper analytical framework to 
be applied when determining nexus in asylum cases has been woefully inadequate. 
The proposal set forth in this Article, in conjunction with the but-for test proposed in 
The New Nexus, would provide a clear, easy-to-implement test for determining 
causation in asylum cases. More importantly, the test would lead to more consistent 
results that are in line with the ultimate aims of refugee protection. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 313. 199 P.2d 1, 2–3 (Cal. 1948). 
 314. It is worth nothing that the burden-shifting framework used in discrimination cases 
has been critiqued on other grounds. For example, in refusing to extend the framework to cases 
based on violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the framework “is difficult to apply.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
2343, 2346 (2009). Other courts have made similar observations. See, e.g., Greenway v. 
Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1998). However, these criticisms go only to the 
difficulty providing adequate jury instructions with respect to the burden-shifting framework. 
Id. (“Requiring the jury to play the ping-pong-like match of shifting burdens is confusing and 
entirely unnecessary . . . .”). Asylum cases are not adjudicated by juries. Accordingly, this 
criticism would not apply. To the contrary, the burden-shifting framework proposed in this 
Article would allow immigration judges and the Board to conduct systematic and deliberate 
assessments of nexus in asylum claims. 
